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Summary 
 
This research project analysed and compared the roles, resources and 
competencies of lay judges in Germany, France and Great Britain, 
where lay judges take up their role through nationally distinctive routes: 
nomination essentially by the social partners in Germany, self-
nomination in Great Britain and election in France. The primary research 
consisted of qualitative data collected through interviews, set against 
contextual information on national institutional arrangements, industrial 
relations, and court procedures. The key findings are as follows:  
 The dominant influence on lay judge’s reported perception of their 
role is their experience of the prevailing industrial relations system in 
each country, mediated by the labour court structure. Routes to nom-
ination not only reflect national systems but may reinforce them and 
have a bearing on employee lay judges’ sense of organisational alle-
giance.  
 While acknowledging distinct employer and employee perspectives, 
there was an aspiration to be impartial and a commitment to fairness. 
This was most unambiguously expressed in Germany and Great Brit-
ain. In France, deliberations were sometimes reported as resembling 
a negotiation between employee and employer lay judges, but one 
that had to culminate in a legally correct judgment. Very few employ-
ee lay judge interviewees reported that they experienced enduring 
dissonance between sitting on the employee side in the court and 
their role as a lay judge, although this was noted by several at the 
outset.  
 Our interview findings from lay and professional judges indicated that 
lay judges bring distinctive knowledge. Some of this knowledge is ex-
plicit and often specific. Lay knowledge is often tacit, however, and 
acquired through long exposure to workplace events. Such 
knowledge was valued by many professional judge interviewees as 
adding an extra dimension to decision-making and was seen by near-
ly all our interviewees as the main contribution of lay judges to the ju-
dicial process. Crucially tacit knowledge is a form of understanding 
that needs to be elicited in the process of deliberations, rather than as 
evidence provided by an expert witness. As well as bringing 
knowledge to the court, lay judges also reported that they could en-
hance their representational and personal-professional skills by trans-
ferring knowledge and experience acquired in court back to the work-
place. 
 Gender played some role in the motivation to become a lay judge in 
Great Britain and in how lay judges assessed their contribution in 
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Germany. Some female interviewees in Britain reported that work-
place problems they had personally experienced had contributed to 
their motivation to become a lay judge. In Germany, there were some 
differences between men and women in their views of the nature of 
their contribution: whereas men tended to emphasise the specialist 
knowledge they could bring to bear in deliberations, women highlight-
ed a ‘social perspective’. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This report presents empirical findings and theoretical reflections from 
the research project ‘the roles, resources and competencies of employ-
ee lay judges in Germany, France and Great Britain’. The project aims to 
fill a research gap in respect of this important group. France, Germany 
and Great Britain were chosen for comparison because they exhibit both 
similarities and differences. In all three countries, individual employment 
rights disputes are adjudicated in labour courts that include professional 
and lay judges, and in which lay judges at first-instance are not required 
to demonstrate legal skills. They differ in that lay judges are nominated 
by the social partners in Germany, self-nominate in Great Britain and, 
until recently, have been elected in France. The four main objectives of 
the project were: 
 to ascertain and compare the resources available to lay judges. 
 to analyse what factors influence lay judges’ perception of their role. 
 to consider the impact of diversity issues. The prime focus in this area 
will be on gender, for which there are statutory provisions in all three 
countries  
 to detail the skills, competencies and activities of lay judges, and in 
particular employee lay judges, in labour courts, and hence ascertain 
their practical contribution to the judicial process.  
 
The research is based on data from interviews conducted with employee 
lay judges, employer lay judges, and professional judges. The method-
ology employed and the sampling procedure are set out in the Appendix. 
This research was primarily concerned to provide a rich qualitative in-
sight into lay judge activity rather than analyse the basis of the legitima-
cy of lay judges. However, the issue of legitimacy is a central one and 
this research does touch on it in various respects.  
The plan of the report is as follows: 
Chapters 2 and 6 deal with the national context for lay judge activity 
the three countries. Context is significant not only for comparison but al-
so because it establishes the framework for interactions between lay and 
professional judges. Chapter 6 offers a comparative analysis of the insti-
tutional situation of lay judges in each of the countries and the resources 
available to them. 
Chapter 7 outlines theoretical approaches relevant to the study.  
Chapters 8-13 analyse and compare the empirical findings gathered 
during the fieldwork. 
Chapters 14 and 15 draw together the research and practical conclu-
sions from the study.   
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2. Comparative overview 
 
The following three chapters outline the national contexts in which lay 
judges exercise their judicial role, encompassing the macro-institutional 
features of the industrial relations and legal systems and the detailed 
context of the courtroom and its procedures. The aim is to provide a 
background against which the analytical chapters can be understood. 
Table 2.1 provides an introductory comparative overview of the main 
institutional differences that characterise lay judges at first instance in 
the three countries investigated in this study. 
 
Table 2:1 Institutional differences: lay judges at first instance 
 
 Germany Great Britain France 
Name of lay 
judge 
ehrenamtliche Rich-
ter  
Lay member/non-
legal member/ 
‘wing member’ 
Conseillers 
Nomination, 
selection 
and ap-
pointment of 
employee 
lay judge  
For employee lay 
judges, union nomi-
nation and nomina-
tion by independent 
associations of em-
ployees. For em-
ployer lay judges, 
nomination by em-
ployer associations.  
Appointment by the 
Land or by the pres-
idents of the region-
al labour courts 
Self-nomination  
Selection by applica-
tion form, sifting by 
private sector compa-
ny, interviews by pro-
fessional and lay 
judges and recom-
mendation for ap-
pointment to Judicial 
Appointments Com-
mission 
For employee lay 
judges, election by 
employees from 
competing lists or-
ganised by trade 
unions (employees 
may also nominate 
themselves). Em-
ployer associations 
usually cooperate 
to produce a single 
list for employer lay 
judges. 
Appointment by the 
Ministry of Justice. 
Mandatory 
conciliation  
Professional judge 
alone  
Separate government 
agency 
2 lay judges 
Composition 
of labour 
court 
 
Professional judge + 
2 lay judges 
Professional judge + 
2 lay judges only in 
certain types of com-
plaint, mainly where 
discrimination is in-
volved. Otherwise, 
professional judge 
alone. 
4 lay judges 
Professional judge 
only if a tie at first 
merits hearing 
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A note on terminology 
In this study, we use the term ‘employee lay judge’, ‘employer lay judge’ 
and ‘professional judge’ to refer to the three judicial actors. These serve 
in ‘labour courts’, the generic term used here to cover courts and tribu-
nals that deal with individual employment rights cases. In France, where 
the first merits hearing in the labour court is heard by lay judges only, we 
often use the term ‘conseillers’ to identify these, as there is no need in 
this forum to differentiate lay and professional. 
  
BURGESS ET AL.: LAY JUDGES | 12 
 
 
 
3. FRANCE 
 
3.1 Industrial relations context 
 
The industrial relations context in France is passing through a period of 
rapid change, initiated in 2014 with the first ‘Loi Macron’, and with further 
reforms in prospect. Some of these changes have directly affected the 
operation of labour courts. Collective bargaining coverage by industry-
level agreements is high at over 90 per cent, albeit often only setting 
minimum terms, via the extension of agreements to non-signatory em-
ployers. This offsets to some extent the low level of trade union density, 
currently some 11 per cent. In establishments with over 50 employees, 
union workplace sections co-exist with works committees that are essen-
tially consultative bodies. 
The French trade union landscape is highly fragmented. Throughout 
the first part of the twentieth century the Confederation Générale du 
Travail (CGT), closely aligned with the Communist Party, was the only 
union of real importance. While the 1930s saw the rise of Christian trade 
unionism (Confederation Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens or CFTC), 
many of whose members left in 1964 to set up the Confederation Fran-
çaise Démocratique du Travail or CFDT, the CGT remained predomi-
nant. In 1948, there was a split in the CGT with some of its members 
leaving to set up Force Ouvrière (FO) due to the CGT’s closeness to the 
Communist Party. Although FO is a diverse organisation, it remains 
strong only in certain occupations. The main union for managers is the 
Confederation Générale des Cadres (CGC): both the CGT and the 
CFDT have also created managerial unions that compete with the CGC. 
The largest and most prominent employers’ organisation is the 
Mouvement des entreprises de France (Medef). However, there is also 
the Confédération Générale des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises 
(CGPME) and the Union Professionnelle des Artisans (UPA, which be-
came U2P in 2014).  
 
 
3.2 The legal context 
 
France has a civil law system. Although there is no strict doctrine of 
precedent, judgments of superior courts guide the lower courts. Labour 
courts, the conseils de prud’hommes, are one of several specialist civil 
tribunals. There is not a separate strand of labour jurisdiction from first 
instance to appeal. Appeals go first to the social division of the Court of 
Appeal on fact and law and ultimately to the Supreme Court on law only. 
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Labour courts hear only private sector individual employment rights dis-
putes. Collective disputes are heard by the court of first instance (‘tribu-
nal de grande instance’) staffed by professional judges alone. More than 
90 per cent of cases heard by labour courts involve contested dismis-
sals. Claims for discrimination are mostly successfully mediated by the 
Défenseur des droits, but may be lodged either with a labour court or 
progressed through the criminal justice system.  
 
 
3.3 History and reform of French labour 
courts (1806-2016) 
 
The conseils de prud’hommes were created in 1806 to act as a forum to 
bring employers and workers together to settle disputes without the in-
volvement of professional judges. The core idea was that conflicts origi-
nating in the workplace could be settled directly between the parties 
without intervention by the state. The conseils initially consisted exclu-
sively of employers but became bipartite from 1848. The balance shifted 
to the employers during the Second Empire (1852-1870) but employee 
representation was subsequently re-established, although not without 
conflicts over the balance between the two sides. Numerous reforms 
were introduced on this issue between 1848 and the early twentieth cen-
tury, with varying approaches in line with changes of régime. In 1907, 
however, the principle of election through a system of ‘colleges’ for both 
sides became firmly established. This reform also granted the vote in 
conseils elections to women. (Although universal male suffrage was in-
troduced in 1848 for political elections, women did not obtain this right 
until 1944.) In 1979, there was a major reform of the conseils, providing 
for election every five years using a system of list-based proportional 
voting based on nominations from trade unions and employer associa-
tions. These elections have since played a role in measuring support for 
individual trade unions. In 2008, the CGT obtained 33 per cent of the 
votes, the CFDT 22 per cent, FO 16 per cent and the CFTC 8.9 per cent.  
The rate of abstention in elections has risen in recent years: only 
some 25 per cent of eligible employees voted in the 2008 elections, add-
ing to pressure for reform. Accordingly, in 2016, a decree replaced elec-
tion with organisational nomination, under which the number of judges 
nominated by each organisation will depend on their relative strength. 
Other recent reforms include the efforts of successive governments to 
relax dismissal procedures and a law in 2015 strengthening conseillers’ 
code of ethics and introducing compulsory training by the official École 
nationale de la magistrature.  
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3.4 Organisation and operation of the 
conseils de prud’hommes  
 
France is unique in this study in that cases are heard by lay judges 
(conseillers) without professional judges: these become involved only if 
conseillers are unable to reach agreement and the case moves to a 
fresh hearing (audience de départage, or ‘tie-break’) at which a profes-
sional judge exercises a casting vote, acting as a juge départiteur.  
Each of the 210 labour courts is structured into five divisions: indus-
try, commerce, miscellaneous activities, agriculture, and a division for 
managers (cadres). Courts (and each division) are headed by a two-
person team of lay judges, a president and vice-president, with positions 
alternating annually between an employee and an employer. These or-
ganise the court’s work.  
The first step in dealing with a claim is a mandatory conciliation hear-
ing with two lay conseillers. This is usually a formal process: in 2013, 
just 5.5 per cent of cases submitted were resolved through conciliation. 
If there is no resolution, there is a public hearing with an adjudication 
panel (‘bureau de jugement’) of four conseillers, two employees and two 
employers. One of the conseillers presides. There is also a court clerk 
(greffier), whose role is to assist the president. In recent decades, there 
has been a significant rise in the level of legal representation, particularly 
for employers, who seldom attend in person. Employees always attend, 
although they are also increasingly legally represented.  
Sittings last for half a day and several cases will be heard over this 
period. A case starts with the employee’s statement of claim and contin-
ues with questions put by the conseillers to the parties and/or their legal 
representatives. It ends with the pleadings by each party’s lawyer. The 
conseillers then retire to deliberate. The pattern of this process can vary 
greatly but often resembles a negotiation with the presiding judge ensur-
ing that outcomes are consistent with the law. If the conseillers reach an 
agreed judgment, this is drafted by the presiding judge, possibly assisted 
by the greffier who will proofread the judgment. Conseillers tend not to 
ask for help and exhibit pride in their ability to write judgments on their 
own. If no agreement is achieved, which occurs in some 20 per cent of 
cases, the case will be referred to a ‘tie-break’ hearing. Professional 
judges are usually district judges in courts specialising in other areas of 
law and are, consequently, never experts in labour law. 
Judgments are often appealed: over 60 per cent of cases heard by 
conseils de prud’hommes were referred to the Court of Appeal in 2013, 
compared to 19 per cent for other courts of first instance.  
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3.5 Status and sociology of lay judges 
  
There are 14,500 lay labour court judges. Although lay, conseillers are 
regarded as judges like any others, or almost so: they take an oath, pass 
judgment ‘in the name of the French people’ and wear a distinctive token 
of their status – a medal that must be displayed at a hearing. Conseillers 
do not receive a salary but are compensated, depending on their em-
ployment status (see Table 6.3).  
Training for employee conseillers is one aspect of a longer history of 
trade union training for union activists. Since the late-nineteenth century, 
the trade unions have provided legal advice to employees initially in ‘la-
bour exchanges’ (Bourses du travail) and later through local legal advice 
centres. The main union centres have their own journals and legal de-
partments. There are labour institutes at universities, established with 
the involvement of academics. Trade union training outside these insti-
tutes is managed by union training bodies, which receive finance from 
the state. Training for conseillers is provided within this framework (alt-
hough this is set to change under a 2016 proposal for joint training by 
the judicial college. Under the system in force when this study was com-
pleted, employees were eligible for six weeks’ training during their term 
of office, some at the start. Both unions and employer associations offer 
training. Trade union training is seen not merely as passing on legal 
knowledge but also as imparting the values the union represents. 
Conseillers come from a variety of social, educational and vocational 
backgrounds: some general points can be noted from previous research 
(Michel and Willemez, 2008). There is a very high degree of gender ine-
quality among conseillers. Almost 80 per cent are men, with a lower rate 
of female participation for employers than for employees. Since 2002 it 
has been mandatory to have equal numbers of men and women on elec-
toral lists at all elections, including the conseils de prud’hommes. Alt-
hough this has reduced gender disparity, it has not eliminated it. 
While conseillers are formally equal, there are some significant differ-
ences. Some 41 per cent of conseillers had either a first degree or post-
graduate degree, with a significant difference between the two sides (56 
per cent of employer conseillers but only 27 per cent employees). A few, 
both on the employer and employee side (in the management section) 
had degrees in labour law or worked in this area in their ‘day job’, mainly 
in human resource management departments. Many conseillers are, 
therefore, self-taught in matters of the law. They also acquire these skills 
via training and their involvement in hearings, deliberations and drafting 
judgments. 
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A second basis for drawing a distinction between conseillers is the 
frequency and intensity of their presence at court. While many attend the 
institution infrequently, others are there on a daily basis and keep the in-
stitution going (for example, by deputising for absent colleagues). These 
are much more likely to be employee conseillers, and consequently have 
time-off rights linked to their trade union activity that enable them to de-
vote a great deal of time and effort to their work at the court. They may 
also be unemployed or retired.   
BURGESS ET AL.: LAY JUDGES | 17 
 
 
 
4. Germany 
 
4.1 Industrial relations 
 
In the ‘classic’ pattern of German industrial relations, employee interests 
are represented through a ‘dual’ system of elected works council and in-
dustry-level collective bargaining. Works councils are entitled to infor-
mation and consultation and, on some issues, joint decision-making 
(‘codetermination’): they may negotiate on specified issues but may not 
call a strike. Most works council members are trade union members and 
often union activists. This cadre of employee appears to constitute the 
background for many employee lay judges and represents a distinctly 
German version of the ‘career’ profile of an employee representative. 
One of the most significant recent changes has been the weakening 
of collective organisations. Three aspects are noteworthy: falling union 
and employer association density; shrinking collective bargaining cover-
age; and the declining importance of workplace codetermination. Trade 
union density is now 21 per cent of the workforce (Anders et al., 2015: 
23). The proportion of employees covered by an industry-level or com-
pany collective agreement fell from 76 per cent in 1998 to 60 per cent by 
2015. There has also been a steady decline in workplaces with a works 
council.  
 
 
4.2 The court system and the administration 
of justice  
 
Lay judges sit as decision-makers alongside professional judges in all 
five branches of the judiciary: civil, family, criminal, administrative, finan-
cial, labour and social jurisdictions. They enjoy the same status as pro-
fessional judges and have statutory protection (they may not be ob-
structed in exercising their role, are protected against dismissal, and 
must be given time off as needed).  
German labour courts were established in their current form in 1926, 
during the Weimar Republic (1919-1933). The labour jurisdiction deals 
with individual and collective legal disputes but excludes ‘established 
civil servants’ (Beamte). (Beamte include civil servants in state admin-
istrations at Federal, Land and local authority levels, and other areas of 
public administration. Disputes over their terms and conditions are heard 
by administrative courts). There are 110 first-instance labour courts (Ar-
beitsgerichte); Land labour courts (Landesarbeitsgerichte), of which 
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there are 18, are the second instance and first court of appeal. Both first 
and second instance are the responsibility of the 16 constituent Länder. 
The Federal Labour Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht) is the final court of ap-
peal in this jurisdiction. On occasions, there have been references to the 
Federal Constitutional Court. 
Lay judges, of which there were 24,269 in 2014, sit at all three levels. 
Each chamber of a first or second instance labour court comprises a 
chair (professional judge) and two lay judges (employer and employee). 
In theory, the lay judges can outvote the professional. Lay judges are a 
minority only at the Federal Labour Court, where three professional 
judges sit alongside two lay judges. 
There are two types of procedure. By far the most common is the 
‘judgment procedure’ (Urteilsverfahren), which deals with individual 
rights disputes between employees and employers (termination, pay). 
The ‘decision procedure’ (Beschlussverfahren) deals with collective legal 
disputes (such as codetermination rights). In 2015, there were 374,095 
judgment procedures and 12,324 decision procedures (3 per cent of all 
labour court procedures). The ‘judgment procedure’ is a civil procedure 
in which the parties must adduce arguments and facts. Aside from ef-
forts to secure a settlement, the court’s role is confined to deciding on 
the matter before it.  
 
 
4.3 Nomination, selection and appointment 
of lay judges in German labour courts 
 
Employees and employers may be appointed as lay judges provided 
they have reached the age of 25, live or work in the administrative dis-
trict (Bezirk) covered by the labour court, and are entitled to vote in Fed-
eral elections (that is, are German citizens). One effect of this is to ex-
clude some 7.5 million economically active individuals born overseas 
from serving as lay judges. Reaching retirement age does not automati-
cally entail loss of office. Should a lay judge lose their status as an em-
ployee or employer as a result of retirement, they may continue to sit un-
til their five-year period of office expires. Employer lay judges can con-
tinue in office without age limitation provided they continue to be em-
ployers and have not been part of the social security system (and there-
fore not subject to the constraint of reaching ‘pensionable age’). Most 
employer lay judges are senior managers, such as chief executives and 
HR professionals, who exercise employer responsibilities.  
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Lay judges are appointed for five years, with scope for renewal. Many 
hold office for three or four successive periods. Appointment is carried 
out by the official department assigned this responsibility at Land level. 
The selection process begins with the submission of nominations by eli-
gible organisations, of which there are several dozen in each Land. 
These are trade unions, other independent employee organisations, 
employer associations, and certain public bodies (as employers) or their 
associations. The appointing authority needs to establish whether these 
organisations meet the legal requirements for doing so, which is usually 
unproblematic for established unions. On occasions, they might be 
asked to submit membership figures to establish their relative strength. 
The position is different for new organisations, such as small or occupa-
tional unions. In these cases, the authorities will examine their constitu-
tions and their capacity to exercise their role (for trade unions, being 
able to conduct meaningful collective bargaining).  
The law requires that lay judges be ‘drawn from lists of nominations in 
an appropriate proportion that reflects fair regard for minorities’, meaning 
here smaller organisations, not social minorities. The usual benchmark 
is the number of members. In quantitative terms, unions affiliated to the 
main centre, the DGB, account for the largest number of nominations. 
For the employers, the landscape is dominated by a few large associa-
tions. Without a requirement to have regard for ‘minorities’, the right to 
submit nominations would be the exclusive prerogative of large organi-
sations. Responsibility not only for submitting nominees but de facto for 
their selection lies with nominating organisations.  
There are two main channels through which nominating organisations 
generate nominations. Either individuals signal their interest to a nomi-
nating organisation, of which they are a member, or the organisation ap-
proaches potential nominees. Within trade unions, it appears to be more 
common for the organisation to approach individuals, guided by the sali-
ence of their activity within the union and their experience, than for 
members to put themselves forward.  Our expert interviewees also re-
ferred to the social prestige attached to the role of lay judge. Nominating 
organisations were also aware that the quality and conduct of lay judges 
they nominated would always be associated with the organisation that 
nominated them.  
Appointment as a lay judge is an administrative act via a letter of ap-
pointment. This is usually accompanied by a formal certificate of ap-
pointment to underline the importance of the process. Lay judges must 
take the judicial oath, administered publicly by a professional judge, be-
fore sitting. 
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There is no requirement for lay judges to receive training before sit-
ting. Whether introductory or subsequent training takes place seems to 
depend on the personal initiative of the president of the labour court or 
whether there is a sustained tradition of such training. The Labour 
Courts Act does not regulate the provision of training, although such 
training is provided to varying levels by the appointing authorities and la-
bour courts, often drawing on the services of professional judges. Con-
tinuing training can be organised by the labour courts, for example in the 
form of half-day events on new case law. Although there is no financial 
support for this, lay judges can log such events as a sitting day and be 
compensated. Some trade unions provide training for lay judges who are 
union members.  
Being removed from office for a serious breach of duty is extremely 
rare. One reason for this might be that individuals interested in exercis-
ing the role of lay judge can only do so via nomination from a trade union 
or employer association. This places at least some, if only symbolic, 
shared responsibility on these institutions to ensure the reliability of indi-
viduals they propose. 
 
  
4.4 The course of a hearing 
 
The oral hearing at a labour court begins with a conciliation hearing be-
fore a professional judge sitting alone, intended to achieve an amicable 
resolution. Such hearings are normally allotted some 20 minutes, which 
can be extended in more demanding cases. Witnesses are not invited. 
The public might be in attendance, in varying numbers; quite often, no 
one attends aside from those directly involved. Robes are only worn on 
occasions by legal representatives. By contrast, the judge and the mi-
nute taker, if in attendance, will wear black robes. The aim of the concili-
ation hearing – securing an amicable resolution of the dispute – is re-
flected in the exercise of judgecraft of various kinds by the professional 
judge, such as alerting the parties to what the ultimate legal position 
might be and outlining the risks and opportunities entailed in pursuing 
the case. If no resolution is possible at conciliation, a date will be fixed to 
continue the case in a full hearing with the same professional judge and 
in addition and employer lay judge and an employee lay judge.  
Between a third and a quarter of cases go onto a full hearing. Typical-
ly, four or five cases are heard in a morning. The procedure is adversar-
ial but there is no cross-examination. Evidence is taken from witnesses 
by the professional judge who manages the proceedings. Parties may 
pose questions but only via the professional judge. Lay judges only rare-
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ly intervene during the oral hearing. As our interviews indicated, lay 
judges’ main contribution is made away from the public gaze in pre-
hearing discussions, adjournments, and interim and final deliberations.  
During the hearing, the judges will also be alive to any opportunities 
for an amicable settlement and may occasionally sound out this option. 
The professional judge is enjoined to do so under the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, with the additional incentive of not having to produce a written 
judgment. 
The judgment is written by the professional judge, who signs it to-
gether with the lay judges. It is promulgated through reading out the key 
points. This should normally take place at the end of the sitting and must 
be in public. In practice, and following deliberations with the lay judges, 
the professional judge will read out the judgment in the afternoon of the 
sitting day, often in an empty courtroom: neither the lay judges nor the 
parties’ legal representatives are usually in attendance by this stage. 
The parties can ascertain the outcome via the court office. 
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5. Great Britain 
 
5.1 The industrial relations and legal context 
 
Great Britain1 has been categorised as a ‘liberal market economy’ with 
little current state support for collective bargaining and employee partici-
pation. Some 28 per cent of UK employees had their pay determined by 
collective agreement in 2015, with a marked gap between the public and 
private sectors, where collective agreements are overwhelmingly negoti-
ated at company level. Trade union density in 2015 was 22 per cent, 
again with a gulf between the public and private sectors (55 per cent/14 
per cent). Most trade unions are affiliated to the main union centre, the 
Trades Union Congress (TUC). The TUC has no formal political affilia-
tion, although many larger trade unions directly affiliate to the Labour 
Party, and there are no rival political union centres. The main employers’ 
organisation, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), has no role in 
bargaining, although it lobbies government on employment regulation. 
There are almost 100 industry-level employer associations. These gen-
erally do not engage in collective bargaining.  
The British legal system is notable for the role of precedent, the ad-
versarial nature of proceedings, and the cross-examination of witnesses 
by the opposing party. Most statutory employment rights are only en-
forceable in labour courts. Nevertheless, the civil courts also have a role 
in some employment related claims based on contractual rights and a 
lay body, the Central Arbitration Committee, adjudicates on some collec-
tive legal disputes such as trade union recognition claims. Appeals from 
first instance labour courts go to the Employment Appeal Tribunal on a 
point of law. Further appeals go to the civil courts. 
  
 
5.2 Origins and composition of British 
labour courts 
 
Labour courts (‘Employment Tribunals’) were established in 1964. Their 
original role was to rule on appeals by employers over official decisions 
(such as the imposition of training levies). From the 1970s, they began 
to rule on party versus party disputes when they acquired a new jurisdic-
                                                 
1
 Great Britain comprises England, Scotland and Wales. Northern Ireland, which com-
pletes the United Kingdom, is excluded here due to some differences in employment 
law and court structures. 
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tion, unfair dismissal. Other jurisdictions followed (including maternity 
and paternity rights, discrimination).  
British labour courts were tripartite from the start with a legally quali-
fied chairman and two lay members, an employer and an employee. Be-
ginning in 1994, professional judges have steadily acquired the authority 
to sit alone on certain cases, most notably, since 2012, unfair dismissal 
(except when the claim also involves discrimination or whistle blowing). 
Professional judges may opt to sit with lay judges in certain circum-
stances even on unfair dismissal cases, principally if the parties say they 
would prefer a full tribunal or if the case is deemed ‘fact heavy’: this 
happens rarely. Where lay judges and a professional judge sit together, 
all have an equal vote. Most decisions are unanimous.  
These changes have dramatically reduced the scope for lay judges to 
sit, a situation exacerbated at the time of our interviews by a large drop 
in the number of cases following the introduction of hefty fees in 2013: 
for instance, £1,200 (€1,385) was required for an unfair dismissal hear-
ing. (Fees were abolished by the Supreme Court in July 2017.) Moreo-
ver, the cases on which lay judges now commonly sit tend to be long, of-
ten 5-10 days, and occasions up to 20 or more, for a discrimination 
case. This has made it difficult for lay judges with full-time jobs to sit. No 
fresh recruitment of lay judges has occurred since 2009, with 43 per cent 
of our lay judge interviewees aged 65 or over. 
 
 
5.3 Lay judges  
 
There were 987 lay judges in 2017: 472 employee and 512 employer. 
They are appointed by the Lord Chancellor for five years, normally re-
newable until age 70 and must commit to being available for at least 15 
days a year.   
Up until 1999 appointment was via nomination by employee organisa-
tions, principally the TUC, and employer organisations, principally the 
CBI. In 1999, as part of a wider reform of public appointments, a new 
system for recruiting lay judges was introduced, based on individual 
open competition. Applicants were asked to complete an in-depth appli-
cation form, followed by an interview conducted by a professional judge 
and two lay judges, and, if successful, recommendation for appointment.  
Open competition has resulted in more women becoming lay judges. 
An evaluation of the 2002 recruitment exercise showed that women ac-
counted for 44 per cent of the 240 lay judges appointed and ethnic mi-
norities 6 per cent (Department of Trade and Industry, 2003). Neverthe-
less, self-nomination has weakened the principle of tripartism as an ap-
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plicant can decide to join either the employee or employer panel. Occa-
sionally the selectors, anxious to fill their quotas, appear to have directed 
a successful applicant to a panel with a shortfall, irrespective of their 
background. Our interviews indicated that some of those appointed to 
the employee panel lacked recent experience not only as trade unionists 
but also, in some instances, as employees.  
Training is financed by the Judicial College, an official body, and is 
provided by professional judges. Once appointed, lay judges must un-
dertake at least one day of observation of a hearing and deliberations, 
with three days of ‘classroom’ training over 18 months. This is frequently 
exceeded. In terms of continuing training, lay judges in England and 
Wales must attend a one-day local training session each year (two days 
in Scotland). Lay judges also receive regular materials to keep them up 
to date with any statutory changes and case law, paid for by the state.  
Lay judges have a right to unpaid time off from work. It is automatical-
ly unfair for an employer to dismiss a lay judge for exercising this right. 
Financial compensation is provided by the Ministry of Justice (see Table 
6.3). There is a lay judges’ association, the Council of Tribunal Members 
(COTMA), to which they can, but not must, belong. Association mem-
bers at each regional centre meet at least annually and the executive, to 
which each region sends a representative, meets four times a year. 
 
  
5.4 Labour court practice and procedure 
 
A claim may not be submitted unless it has first been taken to the official 
Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (Acas) for conciliation. Just 
19 per cent of disputes notified to Acas culminated in a claim to a labour 
court. Acas can continue to conciliate even after a claim has been sub-
mitted, with the result that 35 per cent of claims do not progress to a 
hearing; they are either settled or withdrawn. 
Claims are examined by a professional judge to ensure that those 
with no reasonable prospect of success do not progress. If the profes-
sional judge considers there is an arguable case, he or she will set a 
date for a preliminary hearing, judicial mediation or assessment, or a fi-
nal hearing. At a final hearing, and assuming the case involves lay judg-
es, the professional judge will usually open proceedings, ask for agree-
ment on the issues to be decided, propose a timetable, and ask the par-
ties or their representatives to identify documents that the court should 
read. If necessary, the court then adjourns for reading that can vary from 
an hour or two to a day, depending on the volume of material. Lay and 
professional judges read together in the same room. After this, the party 
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opening the case (the claimant in discrimination cases) calls a witness 
whose written statement will already have been read by the court, ena-
bling immediate cross-examination by the opposing party. After cross-
examination, the judges might ask their own questions. At the close, the 
parties make closing statements, summarising their case and explaining 
how it complies with the statute and case law. 
There is currently no electronic recording of proceedings and profes-
sional judges have to take detailed notes. Lay judges also take exten-
sive notes. These can be useful to fill any gaps when the professional 
judge is asking questions. Moreover, if a party appeals or complains on 
grounds of bias on the part of the professional judge, lay judges’ notes 
may be required during any investigation.  
Lay judges are not matched to cases from the sector or branch they 
come from and the higher courts have held that they should not be se-
lected to sit because of specialist knowledge they possess as this might 
lead them to decide based on their own knowledge rather than the evi-
dence. The extent to which lay judges may draw on their workplace ex-
perience is further limited as the Court of Appeal has held that in an un-
fair dismissal case, the court must not ask what it would have done 
when faced with the same situation as the employer. Rather, the test is 
whether the employer’s action lies within a ‘band’ of reasonable re-
sponses. As a result, the court can find a dismissal unlawful only if ‘the 
employer has acted perversely, arbitrarily or capriciously, or in some 
other way outside the broad band of discretion left to them’ (Collins, 
2004: 35). Employers are also granted considerable latitude to deter-
mine what amounts to gross misconduct warranting summary dismissal, 
provided employees have been clearly informed about which offences 
constitute such misconduct.  
All three judges have an equal vote and any minority decision and the 
reasons for it are included in the judgment. This is a rare occurrence. 
The Court of Appeal, has noted that ‘all efforts’ should be made to reach 
a unanimous decision (Anglian Home Improvements v Kelly [2004]).  
After deliberations, the professional judge, in consultation with the lay 
judges, decides whether the judgment should be given orally at the hear-
ing (with the written reasons forwarded to the parties as soon as practi-
cable) or sent to the parties later. The judgment must identify the issues, 
state the findings of facts, indicate the law and how it has been applied 
and, if a financial award is made, how it has been calculated. Only the 
professional judge signs the judgment. In those rare cases where there 
is a minority decision, this is announced and the professional judge 
writes both the minority and majority views, always showing the draft to 
the lay judges, and often also doing so where there is unanimity.   
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6. Lay judges: terms, conditions and 
resources  
 
This chapter summarises and compares the conditions under which lay 
judges operate in Germany, France and Great Britain at first instance la-
bour courts. It reviews their terms of appointment (Table 6.1); training 
(Table 6.2); financial compensation (Table 6.3); and support (Table 6.4). 
Table 6.1 summarises how lay judges are appointed, their time off rights, 
and dismissal protection. There are many similarities between lay judges 
in the three countries: 
 They are appointed for five years, renewable and all take a judicial 
oath. 
 In Germany and Great Britain, lay judges are asked to dress ‘smartly’ 
but do not wear gowns (unlike professional judges in France and 
Germany). French lay judges wear an official medal of when sitting.  
 Employee lay judges are protected against dismissal by the employ-
er, although in Great Britain the remedy is normally compensation, 
not reinstatement, unlike France and Germany. 
 
Nevertheless, there are key differences. The most significant is the route 
by which lay judges come to occupy their position (organisational nomi-
nation in Germany, self-nomination in Great Britain, and, up to 2008, 
election in France). Looking at the four tables together, other key differ-
ences are:  
 Lay judges in the French labour court are from the private sector only 
and hear only private sector employment claims, unlike labour courts 
in Great Britain and Germany. 
 Lay judges in Germany generally sit for 4-6 days a year, less often 
than in France where they sit once a month on average. In Great 
Britain, annual sitting days range from nil to over 20. 
 There is no compulsory training in Germany, unlike Great Britain. In 
France, training is provided by unions and employer associations. 
Although not compulsory, it is recommended and unions receive state 
financial support.  
 Training in Germany is devolved. In Great Britain, training curricula 
are designed centrally but delivered locally. In France, each union 
and employer association sets its own curricula. In future, all employ-
er and employee conseillers are supposed to receive training together 
under state auspices at the national magistracy school (l'Ecole Natio-
nale de la Magistrature). 
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Figure 6.1 (on p. 35) depicts employee lay judges’ interactions with insti-
tutions and actors. It shows that: 
 Employee lay judges in France have a stronger link with their trade 
union than their counterparts in Germany and Great Britain. 
 Employee lay judges in Germany and France have quite a strong link 
with their workplace, whereas in Great Britain, employee lay judges 
link with their workplace is often weak. 
 Employee lay judges in all three countries always sit with employer 
lay judges. However, French lay judges (unlike their British and Ger-
man counterparts) only sit infrequently with professional judges: that 
is, where here has been no agreement between the lay judges.
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Table 6.1: Terms of appointment of lay judges 
 
 
  Germany France Great Britain 
Appoint-
ment  
&  
with-
drawal 
Eligibility  Employ-
ees/employers 25 
years+ living or 
working in the 
court district if en-
titled to vote in 
Federal elections 
and not excluded 
e.g.  custodial 
sentence of more 
than 6 months. 
Private sector 
employees or 
employers, 21 
years or more, 
French citizens, 
not subject to 
any statutory 
ban or loss of 
core civic rights 
(e.g. right to 
vote). 
A citizen of the 
UK, the Com-
monwealth or the 
Republic of Ire-
land at the time 
of application. 
How ap-
pointed 
 
 
Appointment by 
Länder ministries 
or regional labour 
courts if author-
ised by Länder 
governments on 
the basis of lists 
submitted by 
trade unions, oth-
er employee or-
ganisations, em-
ployer associa-
tions and public 
corporations  
Conseillers 
elected on lists 
by proportional 
representation. 
Employees, job 
seekers & 
trainees over 16 
may vote for 
employee con-
seillers.  
Employers of 
enterprises with 
4+ employees 
may vote for 
employer con-
seillers. Last 
election in 
2008. In future 
nomination by 
organisations. 
Justice Ministry 
appoints. 
Open competi-
tion facilitated by 
an outsourced 
company over-
seen by Judicial 
Appointments 
Commission. In-
terviews con-
ducted by a pan-
el of professional 
judge & 2 lay 
judges. Appoint-
ed by Lord 
Chancellor after 
consultation with 
organisations 
representative of 
employers and 
employees.   
Term of of-
fice 
5 years 5 years (in fu-
ture 4) 
5 years 
Renewal  Renewable  Renewable  Renewable  
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 Removal Ex post discovery 
of loss of eligibil-
ity. Possibility of 
removal for gross 
breach of duty. 
For complying  
with an impera-
tive mandate or 
breach of re-
quired conduct 
in a hearing. In 
future, for also 
breach of duty. 
By Lord Chief 
Justice & Lord 
Chancellor, or 
Lord President of 
the Court of Ses-
sions. 
Retirement 
provisions 
Employee lay 
judges usually re-
tire at 65½. No 
age limit for em-
ployer lay judges 
provided they 
have employees: 
may request re-
lease at 65½. 
Retirees may 
serve: must 
have worked for 
at least two 
years in the 
field covered by 
their section or 
already be a 
conseiller. 
At age 70 
As a lay 
judge 
Initiation Compulsory oath Medal of office 
& oath 
Compulsory oath   
Dress re-
quirements 
No gown for lay 
judges, but 
‘smart’ clothes in-
formally required.  
No gown for 
conseillers; no 
specific dress 
requirements.  
No gown for lay 
judges, but 
‘smart’ clothes in-
formally required 
Frequency 
of sitting  
Lay judges usual-
ly sit for 4-6 days 
per year. 
Lay judges sit 
for 1 or ½ a day 
per month. After 
hearings, the 
president writes 
the judgment.  
Varies between 0 
and 20+ days per 
year. Lay judges 
must be available 
for 15 days per 
year  
Time off 
rights  
Statutory right Statutory right  Statutory right  
Dismissal 
protection 
Dismissal of a 
person acting as 
a lay judge by the 
employer is ille-
gal. 
Employer ob-
struction of a 
conseiller is a 
criminal of-
fence. Dismis-
sal requires 
consent of the 
Labour Inspec-
torate.  
Dismissal of a lay 
judge is automat-
ically unfair. 
Remedy normally 
financial award, 
not reinstate-
ment.  
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Table 6.2: Training 
 
 
  
  Germany France Great Britain 
Initial 
training 
Compulsory 
training be-
fore allowed 
to sit 
No, but some 
courts, trade 
unions and 
employer as-
sociations pro-
vide training  
No, but recom-
mended. Unions 
may provide train-
ing before elec-
tion, but mostly 
after (sometimes 
even after first 
year of office).  
Yes.  
Who delivers Trade unions, 
employer as-
sociations, 
courts 
Universities (Insti-
tuts du travail), 
lawyers’ associa-
tion and approved 
trade unions or 
employer associ-
ations. In future, 
initial joint training 
to be provided by 
the state at l'E-
cole Nationale de 
la Magistrature. 
Professional 
Judges 
Who finances Provider State  Judicial College 
Time spent Varies Varies Minimum: 1 day 
of observation & 
1 day lecture. 
Content Varies Content specified 
in law. Includes 
judgecraft, writing 
judgments, court 
procedure, law.  
Tribunal proce-
dure, the latest 
relevant law and 
cases, judge-
craft. 
On-
going 
training 
Compulsory? No No Yes 
Form Varies Location depends 
on provider 
In Regional of-
fice 
Time spent 
per year 
Not fixed 6 weeks maxi-
mum during peri-
od of office. 
I day per year in 
England/Wales; 
2 in Scotland 
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 Provider Trade unions, 
employer as-
sociations, or 
courts 
Various (higher 
education institu-
tions, some trade 
unions, bodies 
that train state 
employees). 
Professional 
judges 
Who finances Special remu-
neration if 
training offered 
by the court  
State supports 
trade union & 
employer associ-
ation training cen-
tres. Employer re-
imbursed by state 
for employee ab-
sence. 
Judicial College 
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Table 6.3: Financial compensation provided by the state to lay judges  
 
 
 Germany France Great Britain 
Travelling time €6 per hour + com-
pensation for in-
come loss. Com-
pensation may be 
up to €24 an hour 
from the state un-
less the employee 
is entitled to contin-
ued payment of 
wages (usually but 
not always the 
case).  
Conseillers must 
indicate travel 
time as they are 
absent from work. 
Journey time is 
measured at the 
start of office. 
Conseillers state 
at each hearing 
whether they have 
travelled from 
home or work, as 
entitlement differs. 
None 
Expenses of travel Yes  Yes - if travel over 
5 km 
Standard class 
rail or 45p per 
mile for own car. 
Reading time be-
fore a hearing 
None Compensated on 
an hourly basis, 
subject to limits 
(see note). 
During working 
hours: employees 
receive full pay 
from employer 
who is reimbursed 
by state; employ-
ers receive 
€14.20 per hour. 
Outside working 
hours: employees, 
job seekers, em-
ployers receive 
€7.10 per hour.  
None 
Time spent concil-
iating 
Lay judges do not 
participate in concil-
iation hearings 
Lay judges do 
not participate in 
conciliation  
The court hearing 
& deliberations af-
terwards  
€6 + income com-
pensation during 
the whole time of 
the hearing & delib-
erations 
£183.62 (2017) 
per day (10.00-
16.30)  
£91.81 (10.00-
13.00) 
Time spent draft-
ing the judgment 
The judgment is 
drafted exclusively 
by the professional 
judge 
Included in rate 
per day as judg-
ment is drafted in 
the presence of 
lay judges.  
Training  
(per diem) 
€6 per hour by x 
hours + compensa-
tion for income loss 
if state provides 
training 
Employer reim-
bursed by state 
£91.81 (2017) 
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Loss of earnings Compensated by 
Länder if not paid 
by the employer. 
N/A N/A 
Any other matter  Compensation for 
attendance – see 
below 
Employer must 
give reasonable 
unpaid time off  
 
Note.  
In France, the compensation detailed above is subject to time limits as 
follows: 
 Reading time before hearing: conciliation hearing = 30 mins; full hear-
ing = 1 hour; ‘rapid procedure’ = 30 minutes 
 Study time after hearing: conciliation 45 mins; ‘rapid procedure’ = 15 
minutes. 
 Drafting record of hearing/decisions: conciliation= 30 minutes; judg-
ment after full hearing = 5 hours. 
 Reading and signing judgment by the chair of the hearing = 15 
minutes. Drafting an order = 1 hour 
 Participation in preparatory sessions for general meetings: 3 meet-
ings a year.  
 
Each year, in January, all conseillers attend the general meeting (as-
semblée générale) of their court, chaired by the president of the Cour 
d’Appel, where they elect the president and the vice-president (one em-
ployer and one employee) of the court, and the president and vice-
president of each section. 
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Figure 6.1: Employee lay judges’ interactions with institutions and actors 
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7. Theoretical approaches  
 
This chapter highlights theoretical approaches that have been used in 
previous or complementary research and that have informed the present 
study. We focus here on the following aspects: 
 Motivation 
 Experience of the judicial role and adjustment to the judicial system. 
 Mixed tribunals and issues of dominance and control. 
 The contribution of lay judges to the judicial process. 
 
 
7.1 Motivation 
 
Why individuals seek or accept office as a lay judge has not been re-
searched directly. Hollstein (2015) drew on standard theories of action to 
explore why individuals took up lay activity, defined in her research as 
voluntary work rather than law-making as judges, and focusing on theo-
ries of the ‘modernisation of lay office’, in which individuals are motivated 
to undertake voluntary activity for instrumental rather altruistic reasons. 
The two theoretical approaches initially considered by Hollstein were: 
 Instrumental motivations, including rational choice, aimed at benefit-
ing the individual; 
 ‘Normative’ motives, embracing ‘altruism’ and a ‘sense of community’ 
or civic responsibility. 
 
There would appear to be a difference between instrumental activity in-
tended to benefit the individual directly and purposive activity aimed at 
acquiring capacities to serve other goals. In the present study, we ex-
plored instrumental motivation by asking lay judges about their motives 
and the benefits they sought for other areas of their lives. We did not ex-
plore altruism in the narrow sense, understood as a commitment to the 
welfare of others, as this did not address the fact that lay judges see 
themselves as sharing interests with those they represent. We did seek 
to elicit whether lay judges had an abstract sense of justice or were en-
gaged more widely in civic life. 
 
 
7.2 Experience of the judicial role 
 
Labour courts in France, Germany and Great Britain face the issue of 
how distinctive understandings of the world of work can be brought to 
bear on a neutral judicial process. Does this pose a problem for lay, and 
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especially for employee, lay judges? For lay judges themselves, this can 
present itself in several respects: 
 Collision between their role as an employee representative and as a 
judicial decision-maker, referred to by Willemez (2013: e77f.) as the 
‘double-bind’ of ‘judging as jurists and belonging to a trade union at 
the same time’; 
 Gulf between experience as an employee representative and the ju-
dicial setting; 
 The processes through which these differences are resolved by (and 
for) lay judges. 
 
There is some evidence from previous research that professional judges 
noted that lay judges on occasions revealed a partisan affiliation. For 
example, Höland et al. (2007: 224) asked professional judges in Germa-
ny at first and second instance whether they noticed signs of group affili-
ation in the positions taken by lay judges in dismissal cases. Of the re-
spondents, 44 per cent had ‘seldom or never’ noticed such an affiliation; 
around the same proportion answered ‘sometimes’; and 10 per cent re-
sponded ‘frequently or always’. Overall, some 54 per cent of presiding 
judges registered a discernible affiliation.  
This suggests several questions for the present study: 
 At what stage in the career of lay judge or the phase of a case is a 
partisan affiliation and/or distinct perspective acceptable and to be 
expected?  
 How does socialisation/adaptation take place? And how do lay judges 
report their experiences of this? 
 If there is a partisan affiliation at the start of a case, do lay judges 
change their positions in deliberations from a partisan to a non-
partisan stance, and how do they report this process?  
 
There are a number of potential approaches to conceptualising and re-
searching this issue. 
Cognitive dissonance theory argues that individuals are motivated to 
resolve conflicts of attitudes or perceptions when these are experienced 
as an unpleasant emotion of ‘dissonance’. Brehm (1956) argued that, 
when forced to choose between two equally valid items, individuals will 
rate the item they chose more highly to avoid dissonance produced by 
remorse over their choice. In a labour court context, employee lay judg-
es might experience dissonance because their role as an employee rep-
resentative conflicts with that of a judge. If so, how is ‘consonance’ 
achieved? Festinger (1957) suggested several strategies for reducing 
dissonance: judicial examples have been added in brackets. 
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 Change behaviour (always vote for the employee; venerate the court 
and its rituals; identify with the law as a legitimate power).  
 Change cognitions by adding new cognitions as rationalisations 
(‘someone has to do this or it will be run by professional judges’) or 
introducing qualifying cognitions (‘some employees behave badly’).  
 
Cognitive dissonance theory has been subject to several fundamental 
criticisms. For instance, the existence of dissonance is inferred from the 
behaviour of test subjects, presupposing that dissonance exists. If no 
mitigating behaviour is found, the theory implies that dissonance is insuf-
ficiently strong, making the claim hard to operationalise, test or refute. 
‘Self-consistency’, developed by Aronson (1992) to address such difficul-
ties, posited that individuals strive for a ‘consistent, stable’ sense of self 
(Aronson, 1992: 305). For employee lay judges, ‘consistency’ might be 
challenged by a clash between an identity based on defending workers 
as a representative and that of a lay judge making decisions with em-
ployer judges to uphold dismissals. ‘Self-consistency’ also offers a link 
between dissonance theory and theories of identity and ‘careers’.  
Social interactionists (Becker, 1960) construed a ‘career’ as a series 
of stages characterised by experiences, learning, institutional member-
ships and ‘labels’. Harré et al. (1985) also proposed the notion of ‘moral’ 
(as opposed to practical) careers, comprising ‘the stages of acquisition 
or loss of honour’ as individuals navigate the ‘hazards’ of different social 
worlds. Within the wider moral career of an individual, the practical ca-
reer as a lay judge is marked by several significant events (appointment, 
first judgment). Some of these might also constitute stages in an evolv-
ing commitment to the role. Lay judges’ reports of transitions between 
stages, such as hearing the first case, might throw some light on how 
such careers have been shaped. Lay judges’ perceptions of their role 
might also depend on the frequency (‘salience’) with which they sit and 
the responsibilities they exercise in the judicial process (Stryker, 2001). 
 
  
7.3 Mixed composition tribunals 
 
Labour courts in Germany, Great Britain and, in some situations, in 
France represent ‘mixed composition tribunals’ in which lay and profes-
sional judges jointly decide. The main issues for exploration are: 
 the reported high degree of unanimity;  
 interactions between lay and professional judges in court and in de-
liberations;  
 the dominance of the professional judge. 
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Some of the approaches and issues under this heading include: 
 Interaction theory based on status differences. This might also in-
clude the issue of professional judge dominance or lay judge subordi-
nation to a dominant context. 
 Forms of social influence that foster conformity (such as pressure for 
unanimity). 
 The scope for discourse among ‘equals’ with a shared commitment 
‘to apply the law’.  
 
Blankenburg and Schönholz (1979) noted the dominance of the profes-
sional judge (and other ‘repeat players’) over the hearing in German la-
bour courts (ibid. 152). Although lay judges could outvote the presiding 
judge in deliberations ‘their influence in the courtroom is meagre’ (ibid. 
154). Comparative research allows for some investigation as to whether 
this applies generally or is specific to particular phases of the judicial 
process and/or particular countries. For Great Britain, Dickens et al. 
(1985) noted that lay judges tended to be marginalised in employment 
tribunals as a result of the greater formalisation of proceedings, in par-
ticular increased legal representation of the parties. 
Status characteristics theory contends that group interactions are 
shaped by status and that ‘status characteristics’ are anchored in ‘sta-
tus-organising processes’ (Wagner and Berger, 1993: 23). Group mem-
bers’ expectations about the standing of other members are based on 
perceptions of status characteristics, with initial and external status dif-
ferences shaping expectations about the immediate situation and rein-
forcing the power of those with high status.  
National contexts offer different settings for examining status differ-
ences between professional and lay judges. For Willemez (2013: e73), 
status in French labour courts rests on an alternative set of status char-
acteristics, given the absence of professional judges at first-instance 
hearings. The main dimension was seniority, based on in-depth know-
how about the operation of the court.  
Social influence theories look at influencing processes, including 
mechanisms to secure conformity (see Ross and Nisbett, 2011: 28-46). 
Pressures to conform might, for instance, explain high rates of unanimity 
(where two judges agree in deliberations, and the third concludes they 
‘must be right’). In contrast, good decisions might be promoted by ‘insti-
tutionalised dissent’ in mixed tribunals, especially if two lay judges disa-
gree with the professional. Research by Nemeth (1995, cited in Kaplan 
et al., 2006) highlights the value of dissent for improving group cognitive 
performance. 
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7.4 Capacities and contribution of employee 
lay judges  
 
Tacit and explicit knowledge 
Previous research into lay judges’ contribution (Corby and Latreille, 
2011; Höland et al, 2007) suggests that one of their prime contributions 
is the provision of ‘workplace experience’. ‘Workplace experience’ is an 
unspecific term, denoting an input for knowledge rather than an output. 
The fact that this learning takes place mainly at the workplace also un-
derpins the argument for retaining the role of lay judges as it represents 
a form of privileged access to experience not accessible in principle to 
professional judges. In terms of lay judge competencies, possible theo-
retical approaches might include: 
 tacit knowledge, in which workplace knowledge underpins a compe-
tency for understanding workplace disputes and, in some settings, 
eliciting information from participants at hearings;  
 competency also embraces training in law (codified knowledge) and 
judgecraft (technique);  
 lay judges offer multiple perspectives, constituting a potential reser-
voir of constructive ‘institutionalised dissent’.  
 
Lay judges can offer both explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge. Ex-
plicit knowledge covers knowledge that can be codified or reported ver-
bally to the court (‘knowing that’). Lay judges are potential experts in this 
area in that they are acquainted with a separate realm of facts (such as 
technical facts about work processes that a professional judge is unlikely 
to be familiar with). Lay judges’ knowledge of this sort could arguably be 
obtained through witness statements, but having it ‘on tap’ through 
membership of the court might lower the transaction costs of accessing 
it, especially where what information is relevant might not be specified in 
advance. However, whether lay judges possess relevant knowledge of a 
case is both a matter of chance and the labour court structure and/or 
practice and procedure in each country.  
In contrast, the tacit knowledge of lay judges (‘knowing how’) is 
knowledge acquired experientially mainly at the workplace, including ex-
posure to less tangible aspects, in particular norms and values. This 
type of knowledge has a special character since it cannot readily be 
made accessible in a codified form to those who lack these experiences. 
Even if it were written down, ‘full understanding’ would require more 
knowledge, particularly of context – itself ‘tacit’ in nature. One means of 
accessing it is using lay people as decision-makers, as judges. 
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The concept of tacit knowledge is customarily held to have originated 
with Polanyi (1966: 4) who viewed it not as a specific category of 
knowledge but as underpinning all valid forms of knowledge, arguing 
that rules of method cannot be fully articulated. Problems with Polanyi’s 
approach led to efforts to operationalise tacit knowledge for practical or-
ganisational use in ‘knowledge management’ (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 
1995). This also marked the shift from ‘tacit knowledge’ as knowledge 
that cannot be related to a third person to ‘tacit’ as denoting that which is 
not explicit (Collins, 2010: 4). Some attempts to operationalise tacit 
knowledge might have relevance in a judicial context. For example, does 
a professional judge function as a (process) ‘manager’ and elicit ‘tacit 
knowledge’ from lay judges in deliberations. 
  
The ‘education function’ 
Machura (2016) noted that lay participation has an ‘education function’ 
both directly and in the form of a ‘multiplication function’ for those ex-
posed to their lay judges’ influence. Looked at in the narrower context of 
lay skills and knowledge, this represents a form of knowledge transfer 
via the lay judge back to their usual milieu.  
We explore this aspect both in terms of motivation (the desire to en-
gender a two-way flow of knowledge) and the consequences of lay judge 
activity. 
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8. Entering the court and initial 
experiences 
 
Note: 
 In the quotations from interviewees in the following chapters, coun-
tries are denoted by GB (Great Britain), F (France) and G (Germany). 
In Germany, locations have been indicated. German abbreviations 
are DO = Dortmund; MA= Mannheim; HAL = Halle; and B = Berlin. 
 EE refers to an employee lay judge; ER to an employer lay judge; and 
PJ to a professional judge. 
 
8.1 Motivation 
 
Interviewees reported a range of motives for becoming a lay judge. 
 
‘Sense of justice’  
‘Justice’ and ‘fairness’ were cited as motivating the decision to become 
lay judges in all three countries, sometimes as part of a wider ‘moral ca-
reer’, expressed in terms of ‘civic’ engagement, union/class affiliation, or 
both. Several interviewees in Germany and Great Britain reported family 
traditions of commitment to social justice and, for employees, a family 
background in trade unionism. In some cases, ethnic or gender discrimi-
nation had a direct effect. One British lay judge of Caribbean origin, said: 
‘I applied because I had a long experience in seeing discrimination take 
place in the workplace’ (GB EE 22). One British female interviewee who 
had been denied a permanent post because she was married said: ‘I 
was so angry that I decided I would show them’ (GB EE 6). 
 
Defending employees – being a ‘good’ employee representative 
Employee lay judges in all three countries subscribed to the notion of be-
ing a ‘good’ employee representative. Most union nominees and many 
employee-side self-nominees in Great Britain were motivated by the ex-
pectation that becoming a lay judge would help them better represent 
their members. This link was at its clearest for union activists; a British 
lay judge said: ‘It was part of my life: I was a trade union activist. I like 
fighting for people’ (GB EE 9). Similarly, a German lay judge said: ‘My 
motivation actually grew out of activity as a trade unionist’ (G EE B 43). 
 
Building knowledge and expertise  
Developing knowledge and expertise served as an instrumental motive 
for many interviewees in all three countries, in some cases joined with 
the motivation to be a more effective representative.  
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One British employee lay judge noted: ‘It would help me to develop 
myself but also be better able to assist our members’ (GB EE 18). An 
employer lay judge noted: ‘I saw it as being very useful for my career’ 
(GB ER 10). In Germany, the most frequently cited motive was to ac-
quire knowledge to be a more effective employee representative through 
developing legal expertise. ‘There can’t be a better school. The chance 
to sit with a professional full-time judge’ (G EE MA 66). Some French 
conseillers wanted legal expertise to enable them to become a reference 
point specifically on legal matters in their union, with this aspect having a 
more marked emphasis in France. 
 
Civic commitment 
‘I thought I had something to offer’ was frequently noted by interviewees 
in Britain and Germany. In some instances, this was a reflection on their 
acquired skills or an insight due to an individual characteristic (ethnicity, 
disability). ‘The tribunal just brought all my background together’ (GB ER 
13). Social engagement also played a major role in Germany, where in-
terviewees highlighted responsibility. ‘I like taking on responsibility… and 
I hope that I do this well’ (G EE HAL 9). 
 
Personal fulfilment and interest in the law 
Some interviewees in all three countries expressed interest and pleasure 
in engaging with the law. In this respect, being a judicial actor engaged 
both the intellect and emotions of many interviewees. ‘I thought it would 
be very interesting, and it is very interesting; … I still find it fascinating’ 
(GB EE 9). 
An interest in the law was also a motive for some German interview-
ees: ‘This a very fascinating field’ (G ER DO 28). Some interviewees re-
ported ‘curiosity’ and that being a lay judge was an ‘intriguing’ [or ‘excit-
ing’] task. 
 
Financial reasons – and life changes 
As shown in Table 6.3, the form of remuneration for lay judges in Great 
Britain differs from that of their counterparts in France and Germany, 
and generally exceeds it. Nevertheless, nearly all the British interview-
ees said that they were not motivated by money, although some added 
that their colleagues might be. In France, conseillers expressly noted 
that the compensation system did not represent an incentive.  
For some self-nominated lay judges in Britain, becoming a lay judge 
appears to have followed from major life changes, such as redundancy. 
One such employer lay judge noted that sitting on a very long case: 
‘…was a wonderful experience; it was almost like you were back in full 
time work at a firm: that focus and mindset’ [our emphasis] (GB ER 13). 
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In France, there was reference to how becoming a lay judge could of-
fer a ‘way out’ for employees who might have been marginalised at the 
workplace (such as after maternity leave) or who had had difficulty in re-
gaining their position after significant involvement in trade union activity. 
 
  
8.2 Nomination and selection 
 
Up to the present, lay judges in France have been elected following 
nomination by trade unions and employer associations. As a rule, there-
fore, trade unions and their officials are actively engaged in looking for 
employee lay judge candidates with the ‘right profile’, such as a com-
mitment to union activity and familiarity with the law. For employers, the 
decision to stand for election usually depends on being approached, 
possibly by managers who may ask HRM staff to extend their scope by 
engaging with employment law issues as a conseillers.  
In Germany, one of the most common characteristics of employee lay 
judges in our sample was that they had experience as members of 
works councils (or staff councils in the public sector).  
 
‘I was then elected to the works council … became chair of the works council 
and since August 2002 I’ve had full time-off for this role, been re-elected several 
times (G EE MA 67).’ 
 
In Great Britain, there is a distinction between lay judges nominated by 
organisations before 1999 and those who applied independently after 
this. Those nominated by unions reported high levels of union engage-
ment; although some self-nominees were also active union members, 
others were not. In some unions, nomination seems not to have been 
formalised and was often based on personal recommendation; this was 
seen negatively by some self-nominees. One female lay union activist 
noted (GB EE 22): ‘There is a hierarchy within the unions about who 
gets on the tribunals and who doesn’t’. One feature in Great Britain is 
the weaker sense of organisational or social affiliation compared to 
Germany and France, especially on the part of some self-nominated lay 
judges, some of whom applied as socially engaged citizens rather than 
as employers or employees. 
Organisational nomination in Germany and France remains a ‘black 
box’ in many respects. British experience suggests that such systems 
can exclude some social groups. On the other hand, delegating ‘quality 
assurance’ to nominating bodies can reinforce the tie between nominee 
and organisation. 
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8.3 Entering the role – initial experience and 
socialisation 
 
Lay judges in France receive training from the trade unions, but not nec-
essarily before they begin office, which they assume at an official cere-
mony. Lay judges also wear a medal of office in proceedings. Learning 
is mainly experiential and ‘on the job’, with experienced lay judges men-
toring newcomers. France is unique in that conciliation and adjudication 
are led by lay judges who write the judgment. The first time these tasks 
are performed represents an important stage in conseillers’ experience.  
 
‘I did not understand what was at stake during the first few hearings. I was hav-
ing a hard time getting my head around the logic of the law. Here we never 
leave a new conseiller on their own, we always put an old one in with a new one 
(F EE 11).’ 
 
In Germany, there is no mandatory training or induction for new lay 
judges and socialisation is experiential. Several lay judges were critical 
of this. ‘I found myself really in at the deep end’ (G EE B 3). One em-
ployee lay judge noted that being a works councillor offered some prepa-
ration: ‘I’ve not had any training… aside from training I’ve been to over 
the years on the works council’ (G EE B 39). 
In Great Britain, mandatory training was an important part of induc-
tion. A few lay judges noted that initial training had played a part in their 
socialisation into the judicial role. ‘We were advised to behave in a par-
ticular way’; ‘to be careful how you dress and, you know, the formality’ 
(GB EE 24/40). The judicial oath marked a rite of passage: ‘You’ve taken 
the oath, you’re a member of the judiciary (GB EE 9). The ‘law’ also en-
joyed high esteem for some lay judges: ‘I was a bit in awe of the law - a 
working class background, you held judges and the law [in] high es-
teem... It was a bit of a culture shock to start with’ (GB EE 8). Familiari-
sation appears to have quite rapid for most British lay judges: 
  
‘When you first start, then you've obviously been nominated by and put there for 
your industrial experience based on working people. But you realise after a 
while that that really isn't your role. You bring the experience, but you've also 
got to apply the law (GB EE 31).’  
 
Several interviewees reflected on the gravity of the role. An employer lay 
judge, in a senior professional role, noted: ‘When you come out of the 
back door the first couple of times, you think, “woah”. … power’s the 
wrong word – authority – responsibility: responsibility, that’s a better 
word for what I mean’ (GB ER 1).  
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9. Knowledge, skills and training 
 
9.1 Tacit knowledge: workplace knowledge 
and ‘common sense’  
 
In all three countries, lay judges highlighted their context specific work-
place knowledge, including knowledge of work organisation and individ-
ual behaviour at work. This had been obtained experientially and was 
applied in the decision-making process in deliberations.  
In Germany an employee lay judge noted that the issue was ‘to sensi-
tise the [professional] judge to how things really look in the world out-
side’ (G EE MA 58). A German professional judge commented on the 
importance of lay judges’ workplace knowledge: ‘my experiences of 
working life are limited and I can draw on the experiences of the lay 
judges and that also means including and valuing them’ (G-PJ-MA-54). 
The vast majority of employee lay judge interviewees in Great Britain 
said that their main contribution was applying workplace experience. 
One British professional judge noted that such knowledge ‘can add an 
extra dimension to the decision-making process’ (GB PJ 5).  
In France, conseillers acknowledged that they drew on their work-
place experience when deciding: 
 
‘If you work in warehouses, you know very well that there are frequent scuffles... 
We’re well aware that if someone barges against his boss… they’re not neces-
sarily going to get a warning (F EE 03).’ 
 
Some German lay judges emphasised ‘common sense’, understood as 
the everyday reason of lay people that can counterbalance a legal view. 
  
‘I think, it’s experience of life and work that you can bring in and less, I believe, 
legal skills – rather it’s more common sense’ (G EE MA 69).’ 
 
  
9.2 Skills 
 
The skills noted in all three countries were listening, observation, ques-
tioning and note-taking. These were mostly obtained experientially but 
were reinforced by training in Great Britain and France. 
On listening skills, a German lay judge said, ‘I think the most im-
portant thing that I can contribute is to listen to the circumstances of the 
case without any prior prejudice’ (G EE HAL 9). German lay judges also 
referred to ‘sympathetic listening’. ‘One also needs empathy, I think. Un-
derstanding for people who aren’t able to express themselves well’ (G 
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EE B 53). Several British employee lay judges said that they listened 
empathetically, but recognised that this did not sit always easily with be-
ing a judge: ‘I can empathise, [but]... I need to be dispassionate’ (GB EE 
30). One British lay judge listened carefully ‘to spot inconsistencies’ (GB 
EE 35). 
In France listening is particularly important for the conseiller acting as 
the president of the hearing. ‘We need to listen carefully to the claimant 
and the respondent to understand what happened, why they reached 
this point of conflict… you have to “listen well”’ (F ER 18).  
British lay judges also referred to observational skills. All the British 
professional judges interviewed said they valued the lay judges being an 
additional pair of eyes, observing the conduct of witnesses and the dy-
namics of the hearing (see chapter 10 for more details).         
In all three countries, lay judges mentioned questioning skills. This 
was particularly important in France for the conseiller who presides in 
the hearing and asks most questions, including challenging legal repre-
sentatives. ‘A plea is good, but in the end you have to ask questions’ (F 
EE 21).  
In Great Britain, there is cross-examination, with most questions 
asked by the opposing party. While both the professional judge and the 
lay judges ask questions on specific points, none of the British profes-
sional judges interviewed mentioned lay judges’ questioning as a valua-
ble skill.  
In Germany, the professional judge is the principal questioner. A 
German interviewee said: ‘if I do have a question, I prefer to write it 
down. If there’s a break or we’ll give the [professional] judge a sign; we 
can have a short discussion’ (G EE DO 27). German lay judges rarely 
raise questions during the hearing.  
A further skill mentioned was note taking. In France, notes are taken 
by the presiding conseiller, possibly supplemented by the court clerk or 
other conseillers. In Germany, the professional judge sums up periodi-
cally by dictating to an audio-recorder; lay judges do not take notes. In 
Great Britain, in the absence of audio-recording, lay judges can supple-
ment the professional judge’s notes (see too Chapter 11). There was no 
formal training for this, and lay judges used their own methods. 
Writing judgments is not required of lay judges in Germany or Great 
Britain. In marked contrast, in the French labour court, lay judges are re-
quired to develop this skill as writing judgments is a lay judge responsi-
bility, and specifically the conseiller chairing the hearing. 
French lay judges stressed that when writing judgments, they want to 
demonstrate an understanding of the facts of the case that might differ 
from an assessment that a professional judge would make, yet at the 
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same time ensure that the judgment is legally correct. They also want to 
ensure that claimants can understand the court’s decision, so they try to 
write it in ordinary, rather than legal, language. 
 
 
9.3 Legal knowledge  
 
All lay judges interviewed agreed that judgments had to be in line with 
the law and that the application of legal knowledge in labour court delib-
erations was paramount. The extent to which legal knowledge is re-
quired by lay judges, however, varies between the three countries.  
In France, legal knowledge is vital as lay judges sit without a profes-
sional judge. They obtain this through training, self-study and experien-
tially. ‘I learned to read the law… Being involved in the labour court 
means respecting employment law of which we are the judges in the full 
sense of the term’ [our emphasis] (F EE 10). In France, many employee 
judges gain legal knowledge as employee representatives or through 
running the local union legal service. French employer lay judges ac-
quire legal knowledge mainly as a result of their professional activity in 
HRM or as a corporate lawyer. Some French employer lay judges also 
attended training provided by their employer association. ‘Yes, [I pursue 
training] organised by Medef for employers. And it exists similarly for 
employees, organised by unions…. I would say that all conseillers have 
been well trained’ (F ER 32). 
In Germany and Great Britain, applying the law is the responsibility of 
the professional judge. Nevertheless, both British and German lay judg-
es considered that knowledge of the law was important as it enabled 
them to debate more confidently with the professional judge. 
In Great Britain, five employee lay judges in our sample of 41 had a 
formal legal qualification. In Germany, five lay judges had a formal legal 
qualification. 
 
   
9.4 Training  
 
British lay judges must undergo training before they can sit and can only 
continue if they attend annual training. Sitting in on deliberations during 
induction was the most helpful part, according to lay judge interviewees. 
While some lay judges questioned the usefulness of the annual training 
and/or criticised the form of delivery, others said they found this more 
relevant than before, especially the reduced emphasis on law and great-
er focus on judgecraft (such as questioning skills and dealing with bias).  
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In Germany, the decentralised system of court organisation means 
that lay judges have very diverse experiences, with exposure to training 
ranging from nothing to some annual training in employment law devel-
opments, depending on practice at local courts. Some trade unions pro-
vide training for lay judge members. The union nomination system was 
thought to provide some degree of ‘quality control’. 
 
‘I think the trade union is very careful when it nominates someone as a lay 
judge... They should be experienced works councillors with experience of a 
number of labour court cases and attendance at several employment law train-
ing sessions (G EE B 34).’  
 
In France, conseillers had initial training from their organisation. 
 
‘There have been training sessions on how the labour court functions, the or-
ganisation, the conciliation hearing, … the merits hearing, and then after that 
deliberations, etc. (F EE 05).’ 
 
Conseillers are entitled to one week’s training each year during their 
five-year term of office. For employee lay judges, training is currently 
provided primarily by trade unions, especially members of the CFDT and 
the CGT, both of which have their own training facilities. Sessions last 
two or three days and deal with court procedure or a specific topic, per-
haps linked to current events. 
 
‘Of course, there’s training, a theoretical part, a practical part, and we do the 
practical cases, we deal with real cases and judgments. We’ll work on them, 
write them up, make our decision (F EE O3).’ 
 
Such training events are both trade union training and legal training: that 
is law is seen from and rooted in a union perspective, accentuating the 
partisan nature of the lay judge role. 
 
‘One of the first training sessions was with a union activist and it was trade un-
ion tinted. But we also have training with a lawyer. It is not trade union tinted; it 
is the law (F EE 22).’ 
 
Conseillers also acquire legal knowledge through their own activity.  
 
‘When you look at the files, you are given cases from the Court of Cassation, so 
you have to look. There is work you do yourself and it is important to do it to be 
effective (F EE 05).’ 
 
As with employee conseillers, those from the employer side mainly re-
ported that they undertook the training provided by their organisations 
and legal professionals. 
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The partisan aspect of lay judge training in France is soon to be al-
tered. Under the 2015 labour market reform, all conseillers will receive 
initial and continuing training at the National College for the Judiciary 
(ENM). This was criticised by employee conseillers, who said they were 
opposed to joint training with employers, except on the general rules of 
labour court procedure.  
 
‘On some things, why not, on procedures, that kind of thing. But, afterwards, for 
understanding the Labour Code, that’s another thing. That has to stay a union 
matter (F EE 23).’ 
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10. Lay judge activity: preparation, the 
hearing, and deliberations  
 
Much of lay judges’ experience in the court is shaped by established and 
often formally prescribed judicial procedures. Some scope for lay activity 
at the hearing, which varies by country, is determined by contingent as-
pects, such as the choice of means for recording or noting proceedings. 
 
  
10.1 Activity before the hearing  
 
Case papers before and at the start of the hearing day 
Lay judges in Germany did not see case papers before the hearing day, 
although they are entitled to do so. Lay and professional judges said the 
main reason for this was the additional time needed for reading. Some 
professional judges also thought that reading papers would require legal 
knowledge for which training was needed. Nonetheless, some lay judges 
wanted to see papers and some professionals felt it would be helpful if 
lay judges were more familiar with case materials. Lay judges generally 
get access to papers on the hearing day before or during the pre-hearing 
discussion.  
In Britain, ‘case papers’ normally refer to the documents registering a 
claim and the response plus any case management correspondence 
and orders. In addition, the parties produce extensive documentary evi-
dence, known as ‘bundles’. Normally only the claim and response doc-
uments are available to lay judges before a hearing. In Great Britain, 
there were mixed feeling about whether case papers should be sent out 
before the hearing day as cases are often withdrawn at short notice. If 
‘bundles’ of evidence are voluminous, there will be a unique arrange-
ment for reading them in which lay and professional judges read in the 
same room once it has been decided which documents are relevant. 
This reading together is encouraged by the judicial authorities and wel-
comed by most interviewees who found it fostered collegiality.  
In France, preparation by conseillers before a hearing is minimal. The 
presiding judge will check case papers in advance, both to manage the 
hearing but also for procedural reasons, such as to see if there have 
been any postponements and the parties hand over documents at the 
hearing, which go in the file for examination in deliberations. This means 
that hearings are short, often just 15 minutes.  
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Pre-hearing discussion  
In Germany and Great Britain, there was typically a short meeting be-
tween lay judges and the professional judge. In Germany, professional 
judges, who will be familiar with the case from the conciliation hearing, 
organise the discussions. Lay judges valued this and most felt adequate-
ly prepared. In both Germany and Britain, professional judges some-
times used the pre-hearing discussion to communicate the prospective 
direction of the case. Although there might not be prior agreement on a 
legal solution, some mutual understanding at an early stage was seen 
as helpful in Germany as terms for an agreed settlement might be sug-
gested during proceedings. 
In France, there is no professional judge at the first merits hearing. 
The lay presiding judge is more active than the other conseillers, but this 
does not appear to create a comparable relationship to that between lay 
and professional seen elsewhere. Matters are different at a tie-break 
hearing, where a professional judge has the casting vote. The profes-
sional judge will have consulted the file and the lay judges will also be 
familiar with the case as they will already have heard it. There are some-
times discussions between the judges before the hearing, but this is far 
from routine. 
 
  
10.2 In the hearing 
 
Our findings suggest that lay judges play a subtly active and often indis-
pensable part in hearings. Although in both Germany and Great Britain, 
the hearing is chaired by the professional judge, acting in line with pro-
cedural requirements, there are several points at which lay judges can 
and do make interventions often out of public view. In France, the (lay) 
president of the court plays the central role in managing the hearing and 
ensures it is properly run in conjunction with the clerk of the court.  
 
Note-taking and observation 
In France, the members of the court, especially the president, will take 
notes for reference during deliberations, although these do not seem vo-
luminous. Note-taking in France is limited as a record of proceedings but 
central for guiding the judges in deliberations and writing the judgment.  
One notable feature of lay judge activity in Britain is systematic note-
taking, occasioned, in part, by the lack of recording technology and the 
professional judge being required to make a note of proceedings. All lay 
judges reported taking notes. ‘[Professional judges] say that they rely on 
us, especially when they’re asking questions’ [and so cannot easily take 
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a note simultaneously] (GB EE 6). Lay judges’ notes can be decisive in 
the event of a complaint of bias, endowing lay judges with some latent 
power. ‘We often say to the judges “Oh you're lucky to have us”’ (GB EE 
38). Lay and professional judges frequently referred to lay judges’ role in 
observing events in court. ‘Quite a lot of them [professional judges] say, 
“Oh, you’re my eyes and ears,” because they’re writing’ (GB EE 26).  
In Germany, there was little or no note-taking. Professional judges 
used handheld devices to record key moments. Nonetheless, there were 
references to the influence of lay judges’ perceptions of those attending 
the hearing. A professional judge said: ‘[I] often ask them to look at how 
the parties are reacting during the hearing, …what’s the chemistry like 
between the parties’ (G PJ HAL 19). 
 
Questions during the hearing 
Lay judges in Great Britain reported that they felt free to ask questions 
without having to clear these with the professional judge. There was also 
sometimes ‘off stage’ cooperation between professional and lay judges. 
‘If I say “well I'm thinking of asking this” and the [professional] judge will 
say “yes I was thinking of doing that”, then you might say “well who 
might be best to do it”’ (GB EE 39). 
In Germany, lay judges rarely put questions, but were aware of their 
right to do so. One barrier noted was that only the parties may adduce 
facts. ‘We may not add facts ourselves’ (G ER DO 41).  
In France, questioning is central to the process. Through questioning, 
in particular the employee conseillers can exercise their role as repre-
sentatives, typically by asking about the workplace context. ‘We’ll ana-
lyse the fault committed… But we must never forget the context in which 
this happens. An employee who does something stupid, how did he get 
to that?’ (F EE 13). 
 
‘Interim deliberations’ and adjournments 
In Great Britain, ‘interim deliberations’, at which the professional and lay 
judges review the course of the hearing, were reported as common in 
long cases. Several lay judges commented on signalling to the profes-
sional judge for an adjournment, possibly prompted by the professional 
judge’s behaviour or an event in the court. ‘On a number of occasions, 
I've said to the judge, “the witness needs a break; he's been in the box 
for two hours”’ (GB EE 34).  
In Germany, ‘interim deliberations’ take place if there is a desire for 
clarification or to explore the scope for a settlement: ‘it’s an enormous 
help that the lay judges can offer their opinion or even suggest a sum’ (G 
PJ MA 52). A professional judge noted: ‘It can be a positive thing if an 
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employee representative from the lay judges intervenes. This can help 
break down barriers’ (G PJ DO 35). 
In France, conseillers will on occasions challenge legal representa-
tives: lay judges need to show that they know the law, but, as lay judges, 
their main legitimacy does not lie in this. As a consequence, it is im-
portant for them not to be intimidated by lawyers. ‘Some judges, like 
some lawyers, don’t think we’re legitimate’ (F EE 03).  
 
 
10.3 Deliberations and decision making  
 
We divide this phase into a number of sub-sections, covering the basic 
elements of deliberations: how they start, the course of discussions, 
making the decision, and the judgment. 
 
Deliberations – starting and developing the discussion  
In Great Britain, it was common for the professional judge to begin by 
asking lay judges for their views. ‘I want to make sure that there's a dia-
logue going. The contribution is substantial, as well as procedural’ (GB 
PJ 5). Professional judges noted the role of lay judges in deliberations. ‘I 
can think of probably four occasions in the last year where I’ve sort of 
taken a step back and thought “oh right, yes”. Without a [lay] member, 
I’m not sure I would have done that (GB PJ 10).  
In Germany, both lay and professional judges described deliberations 
as a process of collective discovery. Professional judges drew on lay 
judges’ workplace experience on dismissal cases. ‘I’d ask the lay judge 
“Is that grounds for a summary dismissal?”’ (G PJ B 8). Agreement be-
tween the lay judges was viewed as an indication that the decision was 
correct. One professional judge termed it ‘a kind of sanity check’ (G PJ 
MA 52) making the professional ‘much more confident in the solution’ (G 
PJ HAL 16).  
In Germany and Great Britain there was recognition of professional 
judges’ primacy on matters of law, but this was not unqualified. One Brit-
ish lay judge said: ‘…we're entitled to argue the point’ (GB EE 38). This 
division of labour also takes place against the background of the strin-
gent limitations on judicial reasoning in unfair dismissal cases in Britain 
inscribed in case law. This can be a source of tension. ‘[Lay judges] 
think of unfairness in a rather more generalised sense. … I think the law 
is quite clear … and that’s what you have to apply. And sometimes it’s 
with a clenched jaw’ (GB PJ 10). 
In France, deliberations represent a further moment where the differ-
ing roles of lay judges – as representatives and judges – become inter-
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twined, and different aspects of their legitimacy are highlighted. While 
organisational legitimacy (trade union or employer) might take primacy in 
the hearing, legal legitimacy becomes crucial in deliberations, as reflect-
ed in the judgment. 
  
Negotiation and differences in deliberations 
Most lay judges in Germany and Great Britain were willing to disagree in 
deliberations, with confidence growing with experience. Willingness to 
disagree seemed to vary: ‘some lay members… agree with a [profes-
sional] judge as a matter of course’ (GB EE 33). Others were more ro-
bust when in the minority: ‘I don’t say I’ve always won, but I’ve always 
made sure I had my say’ (GB EE 9). 
In France, deliberations can resemble a negotiation. ‘Even in deliber-
ations, there is an employee camp and an employer camp. Afterwards, 
as it evolves, we find solutions based on agreement’ (F EE 13). This 
might include give-and-take in how the judgment is formulated, provided 
it complies with the law. Aside from a concern to avoid appeals, there is 
also a perceived need to uphold the institution of the conseils de 
prud’hommes through demonstrating its capacity to deliver judgments. 
 
Unanimity and majority decisions 
In Germany and Great Britain, there is a very high proportion of unani-
mous decisions.  
Several British lay judges said they were uncomfortable about being 
in a minority and were willing to accede provided they had an opportuni-
ty to air their views. Being in the minority often led them to abandon their 
objections, in line with the expectations of social influence theories. It 
was rare for professional judges to be outvoted by lay judges. Some pro-
fessional judges said it never happened, others rarely or just a few 
times. While reports of this were generally phlegmatic, this was not al-
ways the case. One said: ‘I felt very uncomfortable because I was recording 
the majority’s view, which was totally against mine’ (GB PJ 7).  
Lay judges in Germany also felt that divergent opinions had a hear-
ing. Some noted that unanimity lay in how deliberations were run. ‘It’s 
the [professional] judge who has the decisive opinion and can then bring 
about agreement between us all’ (G ER B 7). This might change if a lay 
judge offered a specialist view that changed the direction of the discus-
sion or if both employee and employer lay judges disagreed with the pro-
fessional: ‘After a long discussion, we managed to persuade him’ (G EE 
DO 27). 
In France, the key issue was to secure a consensus between the two 
sides in deliberations. Once three judges were in agreement, the fourth 
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tended to concur: recourse to a professional judge at a tie-break hearing 
is seen as a failure and often characterised as an exceptional event. 
   
Writing the judgment 
Judgments in Great Britain are written by the professional judge with the 
involvement of the lay judges, although the latter are not required to sign 
the judgment and may not see a written draft, unless there is a split de-
cision.  
In Germany too, the judgment is written by the professional judge, 
some of whom also noted that they would take lay judges’ arguments in-
to account ‘even if it only contributes to my thinking when I’m setting out 
the argument for the judgment’ (G PJ HAL 16). 
In France, the presiding lay judge drafts the judgment, emphasising 
that ‘good judgment writing requires good deliberations’ (F EE 11). Con-
seillers feel entrusted with a mission to make the law accessible: ‘It has 
to be justified, but it’s also got to be readable and understandable’ (F EE 
23). 
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11. Relationships between judges 
 
11.1 Relations between employer and 
employee lay judges 
 
Is the relationship conflictual? 
In Germany and Great Britain, relationships between employee and em-
ployer lay judges were reported as largely consensual and often cordial. 
In France, the extent to which relations between employee and employer 
lay judges were conflictual depended on several factors: however, all 
conseillers interviewed said that relationships generally became less ad-
versarial as time went on. 
One German employee lay judge said: ‘People might say they have 
different interests, but you would not be able to tell really’ (G EE B 5). 
This was echoed by a German employer lay judge. ‘To be frank, there 
are hardly any differences of opinion with most employee lay judges’ (G 
ER B 7). Employer lay judges confirmed that there was frequently 
agreement. ‘I see more things in common than divide us’ (G ER DO 41). 
This same individual qualified this, however. Although he did not repre-
sent the interests of the employer respondent ‘of course, I represent the 
interests of employers’.  
British employee lay judges had similar views to their German coun-
terparts. ‘[I thought] “Oh well, it’s going to be adversarial”. But it isn’t, it’s 
very collegiate’ (GB EE 20).  A further interviewee said: ‘If you could be 
a fly on the wall… you might be hard pressed to tell who had said they 
were on the employer side and who had said they were on the employee 
side’ (GB EE 38).  British employer lay judges generally echoed this. 
One (GB ER 8) recounted how she had sat on a case ‘with the guy that I 
negotiated with… and we had the most horrendous set-to, but [in the 
court] it was totally different’.  
In France, on the one hand, conseillers said that the relationship was 
not characterised by conflict. On the other hand, some recounted epi-
sodes, but these took place elsewhere - not in their chamber. ‘I haven’t 
seen too much of that. Except once, in the industry chamber. I found an 
employee conseiller up against an employer conseiller, both on their 
feet’ (F EE 07). Employee lay judges initially often opposed their coun-
terparts on the other ‘side’ as a matter of course but once established, 
but this did not usually persist. ‘People have a need to assert them-
selves at the beginning … but invariably, this abates quite quickly’ (F EE 
16). Employer conseillers interviewed did not report conflicts, either at 
the start of or during their term of office.  
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In Great Britain, there were opportunities for social contacts that could 
mitigate possible discord in deliberations. Lay judges jointly attended the 
annual training day, had a joint meeting room at labour courts, and found 
themselves sitting on long cases over many days. The Employment Tri-
bunal Members’ Association also brings employee and employer lay 
judges together at its annual meeting. 
However, scope for socialisation would not explain the consensual 
nature of relationships in Germany, given the limited scope for intermin-
gling between employer and employee lay judges. Nevertheless, per-
sonal relationships were sometimes built up. ‘Yes, it changes... You do 
grow closer, you’ll know people’s names… And there’s small talk about 
holidays’ (G EE MA 59).  
In France, employee and employer conseillers normally meet only at 
the hearing and do not have overlapping social lives outside. The main 
exception is the president and the vice-president, who meet frequently to 
manage the court’s business.  
The key factor determining relationships is the nature of the industrial 
relations system combined with the specific organisation of the labour 
court. Social contact might smooth the path to consensus, but is not a 
prerequisite for it. 
 
How do employee lay judges view employer lay judges (and vice 
versa)? 
Although the composition of the employer side panel was very similar in 
Germany and Great Britain, German employee lay judges, unlike their 
British counterparts, did not report major differences. 
  
‘We always basically have the same opinion. I think this is because they come 
from the personnel departments and in some firms they’ve never had disputes 
or arguments (G EE MA 59).’ 
 
German employer lay judges agreed with this: ‘I cooperate quite closely 
with our works council and other bodies in my everyday life at the work-
place’ (G ER B 4). This shared perspective, deriving from workplace 
practice, would appear to have a more marked effect than any – theoret-
ically ascribed – opposition between their interests and perspectives. 
One explanation for the fact that employer and employee lay judges in 
Germany did not see each other in opposite ‘camps’ might lie in the fact 
that distributional conflicts over fundamentals, such as pay, tend to take 
place outside the individual workplace. This does not mean that there 
are no differences of interest at the workplace, but these can be re-
solved through established procedures within the works council system.  
BURGESS ET AL.: LAY JUDGES | 58 
 
 
 
In contrast, most British employee lay judges said that they had a dif-
ferent perspective to employer: ‘we are work colleagues together…but 
our perspectives are different’ (GB EE 13). These differences should not 
be overstated. They were not ‘huge’ (GB EE 24). Some employer lay 
judges valued the perspective of employee lay judges: ‘an angle which I 
would not have thought of (GB ER 7). 
In France, in general, employee conseillers regarded their employer 
counterparts as solely defending employer interests, even viewing them 
as being ideologically motivated. Some employer conseillers drew dis-
tinctions on the basis of union affiliation, viewing members of the CGT 
as more oppositionist than other employee conseillers. 
 
 
11.2 Relations between lay judges and 
professional judges 
 
The relationship between lay and professional judges is characterised by 
a tension, at least theoretically, between superiority and equality. In both 
Germany and Great Britain the professional judge sitting with two lay 
judges chairs the hearing, steers deliberations, and writes the judgment, 
yet all three have an equal vote. In France, the judgment at the first mer-
its hearing is written by a lay judge, yet when lay judges do not agree, 
the decision rests with the professional judge alone. This raises the 
question as to how lay judges can be both equal and subordinate. 
 
Do professional judges have an informational advantage? 
There are two aspects to this issue: knowledge in general of employ-
ment law and knowledge of the specific case. In Germany and Great 
Britain, professional judges have knowledge of employment law through 
legal training and in Great Britain through practitioner experience. The 
position is somewhat different in France as professional judges are gen-
eralists and will not necessarily have had specific training in employment 
law. They learn ‘on the job’, albeit intermittently, as they do not sit at the 
labour court on a daily basis and spend most of their time in other civil 
jurisdictions (Tribunal de Grande Instance or Tribunal d’Instance).  
Another issue is whether professional judges have an informational 
advantage on a particular case. The short answer is ‘yes’ in Germany, 
‘no’ in Great Britain, and ‘to some extent’ in France.   
In Germany, professional judges will have been working on the pa-
pers for some weeks and will have conducted the conciliation hearing 
alone. If conciliation is not successful, that same judge will chair the mer-
its hearing. Lay judges usually only have access to case papers on the 
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day of the hearing. The overwhelming impression was that the gap be-
tween professional and lay judges in terms of prior knowledge of the 
case did not cause concern. If German lay judges wanted more infor-
mation or advice, this was never seen as problematic and professional 
judges were not seen as exploiting their informational advantage. An 
employee judge said: ‘I’ve never found that the professional judge im-
poses a view of what the judgment should be’ (G EE DO 30).  
In Great Britain, professional judges do not normally have an informa-
tional advantage in relation to the immediate case. This is because a 
separate body, the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service (Acas), 
conducts conciliation with no communication between Acas and the pro-
fessional judge. If there is prior judicial mediation or judicial assessment, 
any subsequent hearing is chaired by a different professional judge. 
Moreover, the professional judge hearing the case will not have seen the 
file until perhaps an hour before the lay judges or somewhat cursorily in 
the evening before.  
The position is less clear cut in France. On the one hand, the con-
seillers who attend the tie-break hearing will have heard the case origi-
nally. On the other, French professional judges will have read the case 
file beforehand. ‘The case files, I get them before, together with the doc-
uments and I study them. So I kind of already do the first part of my 
judgment’ (F PJ 20). 
 
Are professional judges seen as dominating or egalitarian by lay 
judges? 
Lay judge interviewees generally described their relationship as one of 
equality, but with some qualifications particularly according to country. 
One German lay judge said: ‘I feel a complete equal and I’ve never 
had the sense it could be anything else’ (G EE B 43).  An employer lay 
judge noted: ‘…the professional judge sometimes doesn’t know what to 
do next. If we’re all sitting in the room as a trio, we can look for a solu-
tion’ (G ER MA 70). 
Most, but not all, British employee lay judges considered their rela-
tionship with British professional judges to be one of equality. ‘We work 
as a collegiate team’ (GB EE 23). Many employee lay judges qualified 
this assessment, distinguishing between finding the facts and applying 
the law: ‘when you’re like on the law, no, they don’t treat you as equals. 
When you’re on the finding of facts, then yes they do’ (GB EE 25). Some 
British employee lay judges also noted that their relationship with the 
professional judge varied: ‘some [professional] judges love having lay 
members there…. And other [professional] judges think we’re a com-
plete waste of time’ (GB EE 33).  
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In France, conseillers expressed a range of views about professional 
judges. Even in the same interview, a conseiller might say both that pro-
fessional judges exercised domination but also that they were equal. 
  
‘I consider them [professional judges] equals. Professional judges generally 
treat us very well… We have studied differently but we are all people and 
equal… They're not specialists like us. On some things, we know more than 
they do (F EE 03).’ 
 
Many conseillers, however, reported that professional judges dominated 
at tie-break hearings. ‘Often what happens is that when they arrive, 
they’ve already made the decision. ... I don’t have the impression that 
we have much influence in the discussion’ (F EE 13). Some conseillers 
labelled professional judges as partisan: ‘One of the [professional] judg-
es, she is more like the employer’ (F EE 23). We did not encounter this 
in Germany or Great Britain.   
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12. Consequences and reflections on 
experience 
 
This chapter reviews how lay judges perceived their activity and its con-
sequences for their professional and personal lives. 
 
 
12.1 Neutrality and impartiality 
 
Lay judges in all three countries are required to manage the tension be-
tween their status as ‘representing’ one side and their role as (impartial) 
judges. Overall experience of this tension abated quite quickly in all 
three countries, without necessarily weakening their underlying alle-
giance. 
Although lay judges in Britain felt they could be impartial, several 
acknowledged that they might be ‘influenced by a particular perspective’ 
(GB EE 38). Some noted that it took the experience of a few cases for 
them to divide their judicial role from everyday activity, especially if they 
spent their working lives in an adversarial environment. German lay 
judges reported similar experiences. Any partiality that did occur was re-
solved by the legal position (‘I save myself with the law’, G EE HAL 19). 
  
‘Naturally, my everyday working life is the employee standpoint. … But you 
have to be able to switch your perspective, yes. And I can do that (G EE B 53).’ 
 
Some German lay judges described how they might change ‘allegiance’. 
‘You’re also aware of the thought “I’ve been selected for the employer 
side”. But after you’ve heard the evidence, everything can be quite dif-
ferent’ (G ER MA 70). Professional judges said that lay judges set aside 
their origins in the court: ‘There’s no sort of class struggle in the retiring 
room’ (G PJ B 6). Some employee lay judges described how an emo-
tional stance gave way to a more ‘objective’ approach with experience.  
In France, imperative mandates on conseillers are forbidden. None-
theless, conseillers serve as representatives of their ‘side’. For many 
conseillers, this poses a difficulty. ‘You have to be neutral. You’re not 
there specifically to represent the employee. That’s the difficulty’ (F EE 
38). All conseillers insisted that they judged in conformity with the law. 
But employee conseillers also recognised that facts are not presented in 
a neutral way. 
 
‘Being neutral is very difficult, especially when you already have a union history 
behind you and have seen what employers do, some employers at least, not all. 
So it's impossible to be neutral (F EE 35).’ 
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For some employee conseillers, however, being elected by one side 
does not mean defending its members: ‘You can’t serve as an advocate 
for employees. We are there to comply with the letter of the law’ (F EE 
34). How this is perceived tends to evolve with experience. One employ-
ee lay judge noted: 
 
‘When you start, in your head, you’re there to defend employees. But in the end, 
people calm down relatively quickly. You realise that you’re judges, and have to 
maintain a certain neutrality (F EE 23).’ 
 
British lay judges noted several factors that fostered impartiality. Firstly, 
there was a moral commitment to fairness: ‘…it would have been totally 
unfair to have been biased towards one side’ (GB EE 32). Secondly, fact 
finding was seen as a check on any bias. ‘It's about objectivity and facts’ 
(GB EE 36). And thirdly, some self-nominated interviewees reported that 
they could be objective because they could have sat as an employer or 
employee lay judge: ‘I think I can [be impartial] because I could have 
been on the other side’ (GB EE 14). Several British employee lay judges 
with trade union roles said being impartial flowed from the capacity to be 
objective when assessing members’ grievances: ‘I think I can be impar-
tial. … I can make hard decisions’ (GB EE 9). 
 
  
12.2 Effects on career and work 
relationships 
 
In this section, we consider what lay judges told us about the impact of 
their activity on their career and identity, their relationship with their trade 
union (for employee lay judges), and the scope for transferring 
knowledge and skills to other aspects of their individual and professional 
lives.  
 
Career and personal development 
In France, becoming a lay judge can open the door to involvement in le-
gal activity for those who have no other union role or missed out on a le-
gal career. Some employee conseillers discover the law through activity 
at the labour court and trade union training and wish to obtain a legal 
qualification. ‘I love these courses. And then I'll try to get a law degree at 
university’ (F EE 39). The experience also boosted self-confidence. 
‘When you are a conseiller, it builds confidence and I was able to make 
use of this in my last job’ (F EE 38). For employers, serving as a con-
seiller is an extension of their professional life. ‘Being a conseiller is 
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linked to my career. I was an employment lawyer to begin with and I now 
have a human resource consulting and training firm’ (F ER 09). 
In Great Britain, being a lay judge gave both status and agency. ‘I see 
it as quite an honour’ (GB EE 23). ‘I'm taking part in it - an actor!’ (GB EE 
10). Several interviewees referred to ‘credibility’ and a greater sense of 
power at the workplace: ‘Some managers are a bit wary of me’ (GB EE 8). 
German lay judges reported that the opportunities provided by lay 
judge activity led to greater recognition. ‘Because in the union, there is a 
different status, whether you’re just a simple member or have an office, 
or are a lay judge… I’ve noticed that there is much more acceptance’ (G 
EE MA 58). 
 
Relationship with trade unions and workplace representation 
For trade unionists in France, acting as a conseiller represents a contin-
uation of union engagement, especially for workplace representatives. 
Trade unionists in these roles pass through a cursus honorum. They 
begin at the workplace, as a staff delegate or union representative, 
move on to duties outside the workplace, either within the union or on 
bodies on which unions are represented, and finally become a conseiller 
as a reward for commitment.  
In Germany, the overwhelming majority of employee lay judges inter-
viewed said that nothing had changed in their relationship to their trade 
union.  
In Great Britain, the link between employee lay judges and trade un-
ions is generally reported as weak, although some employee judges 
serve as workplace union representatives. Some trade unions welcomed 
the fact that their officials had become lay judges through self-
nomination and could transfer knowledge back to the union. Two female 
union officials, however, who had been appointed after the system via 
self-nomination, experienced hostility from trade union colleagues. 
  
Knowledge transfer 
The scope to transfer knowledge to other fields was identified as one 
motive for taking up the role. In some instances, this was related directly 
to professional development in an instrumental way; in others, the focus 
was on becoming a better employee representative.   
Most British and French employee lay judge interviewees reported 
some knowledge transfer. Two British interviewees said their trade un-
ions invited them to contribute to union training, while several said that it 
improved how they dealt with grievances. All British employer lay judges 
interviewed reported knowledge transfer: experience at the court had 
helped them as HR professionals, consultants, or employers. 
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Similarly in France, there was knowledge transfer to the workplace. 
‘Being on the labour court has helped me a great deal in knowing how to 
manage a discussion, a negotiation’ (F EE 03). Some conseillers ex-
plained that their sheer presence deterred management from a dismis-
sal: ‘when you are a conseiller, employers know you know the law, so if 
they try anything on you’ll be sure to win’ (F EE 35).  
Lay judges in Germany, for whom this was a core motive, also appre-
ciated the scope to transfer experience gained at the court to their work-
places. ‘It will certainly be helpful for my job as a works councillor at 
work, getting a broader point of view; (G EE MA 63). 
 
  
12.3 Reflections on experience 
 
 
Discovery of law – intrinsic pleasure 
Most lay judges interviewed in Great Britain expressed feelings of pleas-
ure and enjoyment: ‘I love doing the big cases … because of the com-
plexity of what's going on’ (GB EE 33).  
In France, most lay judges were very satisfied with their activity. Law 
appears to be source of intrinsic pleasure, including attending trade un-
ion training. ‘I had two training courses a year. … I am happy to do this. 
… it’s become a drug, a passion’ (F EE 36). 
German lay judges also reported that serving as a lay judge was a 
type of personal enrichment: ‘it definitely broadens the mind’ (G EE DO 
51). ‘Fun, interesting and you learn new things’ (G ER DO 45). 
  
Upholding the system 
Virtually all lay judges from Great Britain expressed strong support for 
their continuing role in adjudication. One employee lay judge noted: ‘I 
believe that employee lay members bring a unique perspective to the 
employment tribunals … and we can bring that to bear in deliberations’ 
GB EE 22).  
In France, lay judges invariably defended the institution of the labour 
court. They are unanimously opposed to the recent reforms, character-
ised by some as ‘regressions’. 
Participation was seen as very important for interviewees in Germany 
as a contribution to upholding the system of labour law and ensuring it 
was applied fairly. Defending the institution of the labour court as a dis-
tinctive forum of obtaining redress and fairness was cited by many inter-
viewees. 
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Regrets and criticisms 
In Great Britain, many lay judges criticised recent changes that led to 
more professional judges sitting alone on unfair dismissal cases and the 
fall in the number of cases due to fees being charged between 2013 and 
2017, which covered the period of our interviews. ‘When they’ve allowed 
judges to sit alone, I think that has sort of lessened our role’ (GB EE 20). 
‘I do worry that people who need access to justice just can't afford it any 
more: they just give up… (GB EE 33). Concerns were expressed that 
the reduced opportunities to sit could erode judicial skills.  
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13. Suggestions for improvement – and 
implications for practice 
 
The suggestions for improvement offered by lay judges are grouped by 
country as they frequently address specific features of national systems. 
 
 
13.1 France 
 
In France, conseillers were relatively satisfied with the justice provided 
by the labour courts. They considered they performed their duties well, 
as confirmed by the professional judges interviewed. Although training is 
not (currently) mandatory, most conseillers attend training and are eager 
to be trained, either ‘on the job’ by a more experienced lay judge and/or 
through locally organised events.  
Conseillers did, however, have complaints about the lack of re-
sources provided by the authorities: they do not always have a desk and 
computer in court, have to write judgments at home, and do not always 
have access to a library with the necessary legal documentation and 
must subscribe to journals themselves or rely on their trade union, some 
of which, such as the CGT, provide free access for conseillers to legal 
journals. Above all, they complained that the authorities did not allow 
them more time to examine case files, and for the hearing, deliberations, 
and drafting judgments. Although they underlined the fact that their 
commitment was a form of voluntary engagement, they were critical that 
the state did not fully recognise the time they spent. In particular, com-
pensation arrangements were an obstacle.  
Lay judges expressed concern about the 2016 reforms that are now 
being implemented and which may significantly alter how labour courts 
operate. Rather than proposing improvements to the existing system, 
conseillers adopted a defensive stance towards the institution of the 
conseils, which they see as under threat. For employee conseillers, their 
prime concern is to preserve what exists, notably the close link and bal-
ance between themselves and three domains of justice, trade union, and 
the workplace.  
The reforms pose a number of questions for the institution and for 
conseillers themselves, in particular on the issue of trade union-based 
training. Without knowing the answers to these, lay judges have found it 
difficult to make practical recommendations for improving the system. 
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13.2 Germany 
The main areas for improvement identified in Germany were as follows. 
 
1. Induction and training 
Training was the most common area noted both by lay and professional 
judges. Specific suggestions were for training for new lay judges, with 
further regular training on statute and case law. 
 
‘I was recently nominated and appointed as a lay judge and then had my first 
hearing. I didn’t know how I should behave, where I should report to, what I was 
permitted to do, and not permitted to do, what they wanted from me, what was 
required... It would be a good idea to have an introduction before the first sitting 
(G EE DO 25).’ 
 
‘Some training once a year ... so you can be kept up-to-date with the most re-
cent cases (G EE HAL 9).’ 
 
In addition to training, some lay judges also expressed a desire for an 
opportunity to have a regular (annual) exchange about their experienc-
es, to include the professional judges. 
 
‘Once a year a meeting of lay judges at their local labour court just to have an 
exchange. … it would also be useful if the professional judges attended. Just to 
have some exchange and get to know each other a bit better, and not just these 
two to three hours when you’re called in for a sitting, and that’s often too short. I 
think both sides would benefit from some intensive exchange (G EE MA 69).’ 
 
Expert interviews with members of the Berlin lay judge committee em-
phasised a need for more training, and also the desire for a structured 
introduction to the post of lay judge for new appointees before they sit on 
a case, something provided in Berlin at the initiative of the lay judges’ 
committee. 
 
2. Preparation for hearings 
The second main suggestion was for more intensive preparation ahead 
of cases, preferably in the form of short notes, summarising the key is-
sues. Only a few lay judges wanted access to case files.  
 
I would like things to be arranged in a similar way to the Land labour court, so 
that you get perhaps a written synopsis of each case. Because time is some-
times short when we’re given some information, especially if the preceding case 
has been delayed for whatever reason (G EE DO 46).  
 
That you get some basic information when you get the invitation to attend. What 
is this case about? So you know and can prepare. Just knowing which law to 
take along (G EE HAL 9).  
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Lay judges wanted to improve the pre-hearing discussion. ‘It would be 
enough for me if each [professional judge] was obliged to give a clear 
and understandable introduction’ (G EE MA 63). Around half the profes-
sional judges interviewed did not support providing preparation for first-
instance hearings using case documents. Others were in favour of im-
proving the preparation of lay judges for each case. 
 
Other suggestions made by lay judges included:  
 More frequent sittings; 
 Participation in conciliation hearings or subsequent hearings; 
 Better information about the hearing schedule; 
 More scope for exchange between lay judges outside of hearings. 
 
 
13.3 Great Britain 
 
The four most frequent suggestions were: 
 
1. Reinstate lay judges to dismissal cases 
Lay judges said almost unanimously that they should sit on all cases, in-
cluding unfair dismissal. ‘I believe the system would actually be more ef-
fective if we went back to the system that members sit on all the cases’ 
(GB ER 13). Most professional judges we interviewed echoed this view, 
and one emphasised the need for retaining a lay decision-making role as 
judges rather than as assessors. ‘I think if someone’s going to be in-
volved, they’ve got to be importantly involved’ (GB PJ 10). 
 
2. Selection criteria and panel composition 
Some lay judges were concerned about selection and argued for more 
‘detailed criteria’ (GB EE 6) to ensure that those appointed had appro-
priate workplace knowledge. Lay judge selection was also raised by 
some professional judges, focusing on how best to match workplace or 
other experience with the type of case: ‘perhaps more rigour in the re-
cruitment process or even in terms of the pool that we have… some way 
of ensuring that the right members sit on the right cases’ (GB PJ 1). One 
professional judge raised the issue of the specialist nature of cases, and 
whether it was reasonable for non-specialist lay judges to be aware of 
the complexities of certain cases. 
 
‘I think that specific expertise in areas might be far more useful…. We get a lot 
of medical cases where doctors are claiming under [their] complicated con-
tracts… someone with an experience of that area would be so much more help-
ful in terms of cutting through what is a huge amount of material to the real nub 
(GB PJ 10).’ 
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3. Papers in advance 
Several lay judges and one professional were in favour of changing ac-
cess to case papers and reading. ‘I believe we should have a reading 
day before anything happens… We do it and then we call them in. We’re 
not wasting their time and we’re not wasting our time’ (GB EE 10). An-
other said: ‘I think lay members could read in advance; then more cases 
could be done… that might be a way of dealing with some small cases’ 
(GB EE 29). While aware of the difficulties, both lay and professional 
judges thought earlier access to basic documents would be useful. 
 
‘It's not practical to send the papers in advance because [of] the cost involved 
and the fact that the case might be settled... But it would be helpful to have 
more time I think in the morning of day one of the case, to go through the pa-
pers on one’s own and also then with the judge (GB ER 7).’ 
 
‘There shouldn't be any reason why the judge and his or her members shouldn’t 
be able to electronically see the key papers two or three days before (GB ER 
13).’ 
 
One professional judge also favoured earlier access to case papers. 
 
4.  More technology 
Several lay judges wanted improved use of technology.  
 
‘On some cases you can have two or three lever-arch files... to have three peo-
ple sat on the panel each with three lever-arch files, looking for the same docu-
ment …. It would be ideal just to put the document… on a screen and make ref-
erence from there (GB EE 7).’ 
 
An employer lay judge also argued for recording the hearing: ‘we really 
are having a lot of complaints coming in which involves the judges, par-
ticularly the regional judges, in a huge amount of work and they've got 
nothing except notes’ (GB ER 6). 
 
Other suggestions: 
 Training: many English and Welsh lay judges wanted the restoration 
of two days of annual training as before, and still the practice in Scot-
land, not the current annual one-day. While some wanted better initial 
training, others argued for shorter but regular training.  
 Appraisal: a couple of lay judges wanted a formal appraisal of lay and 
professional judges. 
 Conciliation: one lay judge felt there might be a role for lay judges 
earlier in the process. 
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Suggestions for improvement – summary 
 
 Training: in Germany, induction for new appointees and regular re-
fresher training. In England and Wales, reinstatement of 2 days of 
training per year as is the practice currently in Scotland.  
 A formal mentoring system for new lay judges, mentioned in all 
three countries.  
 More frequent and regular sittings for lay judges  
 In Germany, provision of short notes for guidance ahead of the 
hearing. 
 Lay judge involvement in conciliation/mediation: currently the pro-
fessional judge in Germany conciliates alone and in Great Britain 
there is judicial mediation in a minority of cases by a professional 
judge alone, even though some lay judges are trained and experi-
enced mediators.  
 Where possible, assign cases to lay judges with known expertise in 
the issue/area.  
 Reinstate lay judges to unfair dismissal cases in Great Britain.  
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14. Conclusions 
 
14.1 Influence of the route to nomination 
 
The dominant influence on lay judge’s reported perception and experi-
ence of their role is the prevailing industrial relations system in each 
country, mediated primarily by the labour court structure and to a lesser 
extent by the route to nomination. Lay judges are likely to have had ex-
perience of organised industrial relations systems in the three countries 
researched, which might not necessarily reflect the labour market as a 
whole, given the trend towards dualism in all three countries. This expe-
rience of organised industrial relations reflects the fact that nomination to 
the role of lay judge has been via industrial relations institutions. At a 
minimum in France and Germany, potential employee lay judges will be 
trade union members, given the central role of unions in locating and 
nominating candidates. And in Germany working at a workplace with a 
works council (or public sector equivalent) also plays a large part in the 
route to nomination. The situation is different in Great Britain. In the past, 
nomination was via an organisation, and long serving lay judges in Brit-
ain report this background. Since 1999, such institutional links have be-
come weaker, reflected in the motivations and experiences of some of 
the more recently appointed lay judges.  
Our interviewees in Great Britain and Germany reflected national in-
dustrial relations systems in many instances. For example, reported in-
dividualism, consistent in some respects with the ‘modernisation’ theory 
of lay engagement, appeared higher in Great Britain than in Germany, 
where many employer and employee lay judges retained institutional 
links. French interviewees, in many cases, reflected inter-union competi-
tion and a commitment to trade unions as the main legitimate channel 
for defending employee interests, expressed in scepticism about official-
ly-provided training.  
The three routes to nomination not only reflect national systems but 
also reinforce them (for example, offering scope to an individual-
instrumental perspective in Great Britain, exacerbating inter-union com-
petition in France, and emphasising the link with codetermination in 
Germany).  
One area where there was some discernible link with the route to 
nomination was in the organisational allegiance expressed by some em-
ployee lay judges. This appears strongest in France, where lay judges 
have been elected on trade union lists and, in the future, will be nomi-
nated by them. The training regime in France influences this: in the past 
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and currently, it is provided for employee lay judges predominantly by 
trade unions. 
Lay judges’ perception of their role is also influenced by the role of la-
bour courts in national systems of employment regulation. In France, lay 
judges’ perceptions of the labour court system offer some support for 
Emmenegger’s (2014) thesis that fragmented and politicised trade union 
movements are more inclined to turn to the law rather than collective 
bargaining to protect employee interests. German interviewees’ reports 
were strongly shaped by the culture and experience of workplace code-
termination. In Germany, some lay judges also expressly referred to how 
labour courts stood in relation to the wider constitutional system, which 
they were keen to uphold. Serving as a lay judge implied a form of civic 
engagement as well as representing an interest. 
There was no identifiable association between these perceptions and 
personal characteristics, aside from some discernible influence of gen-
der: some women reported certain aspects of their experience differently 
to men. These are explored below. 
 
 
14.2 Motivations 
 
Our lay judge interviewees reported a range of intertwined motivations – 
instrumental, normative and some cases personal-emotional. For em-
ployee lay judges in all three countries, one strong motive was a marked 
sense of justice both around workplace issues but also more widely. 
Similar motives were also expressed by many employer lay judges, 
complemented in some instances by the prospect of professional en-
hancement. There were some discernible national patterns. In Germany, 
the most common cited motive for becoming an employee lay judge was 
to improve knowledge of the law in order to transfer this back to the 
workplace. In France, for some lay judges, the role of conseiller was one 
component of a wider career in employee representation, their union and 
in the legal field. And in Great Britain too, there was often a link to work-
place representation, but also evidence of individual-instrumental moti-
vation, consistent with the ‘modernisation’ theory of lay engagement 
(see Chapter 7.1), which was more marked for employer than employee 
judges.  
The multiplicity of motives reported by interviewees lends some sup-
port to Hollstein’s (2015) study of voluntary social engagement. In some 
respects, however, serving as a lay judge differs from other fields of vol-
untary engagement as instrumental and altruistic motivations fit less well 
with the notion of interest representation that is intrinsic to the idea of 
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employer/employee panels. The motivation to act as a representative of 
a social collectivity based on shared interests is not reducible to ‘instru-
mentalism’ or ‘altruism’. ‘Instrumental’ also has different meanings de-
pending on whether it is understood as ‘rational-purposive’ (being a ‘bet-
ter representative’) or self-interest (‘helping my career’). For many inter-
viewees, becoming a lay judge was rational-purposive, but not individu-
alist, in that lay judge activity was perceived as useful for serving as an 
employee representative. This was based on a prior choice that might 
reflect a ‘normative’ commitment but also a notion of interests. Serving 
as an employee representative, as reported in France, in which the vari-
ous stages from workplace representative to lay judge are seen in terms 
of self-fulfilment and esteem, also reflects the notion of ‘expressive ca-
reer’ suggested by Harré et al. (1985). 
 
 
14.3 Adaptation to the court – impartiality 
 
Being a lay judge was generally not perceived by lay judge interviewees 
as a form of interest representation carried into the judicial field. Or ra-
ther, for many employee lay judges, any sense of being a representative 
is modified through membership of the court, with its distinct responsibili-
ties.  
Our interviewees’ responses suggest some national differences in 
how judicialisation takes place. In France, interest representation seems 
more overt and persists for longer in labour court proceedings, especial-
ly those phases open to public view. The maintenance of a consistent 
identity (Aronson, 1992) for employee lay judges in France was possibly 
facilitated by the acceptability of a more adversarial environment in 
which reaching a judgment by employer and employee lay judges could 
be cast as an ‘agreement’, with its undertones of remaining an industrial 
relations institution, rather than requiring lay judges to shed their exter-
nal identity. 
In Germany, employee lay judge interviewees indicated a desire to 
ensure that employee interests were protected, but also emphasised the 
importance of upholding the system. The process of adaptation to the 
labour court mostly took place swiftly, despite the lack of mandatory in-
duction. In Great Britain, adaptation also generally took place swiftly, 
sometimes after just a few cases. Nevertheless, there were variations 
between individual lay judges. The speed of adaption might be more de-
termined by the role that a person played before becoming a lay judge, 
such as a trade union official or lay workplace representative, than the 
national setting.  
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Very few employee lay judge interviewees reported enduring disso-
nance between being an employee representative and a lay judge. Cog-
nitive dissonance theory suggests that actors will reduce dissonance by 
placing a high value on their choice (here becoming a lay judge) or 
changing their cognitions or perception of the situation. This was exem-
plified in the case of some interviewees in a positive view of judicial insti-
tutions, an interest in the law, and expressing a realisation that both em-
ployers and employees could be culpable. There are alternative expla-
nations for these reported experiences. In France, for example, the so-
cial influence of peers through mentoring would appear to play a major 
part in adaptation to the court, albeit reinforced by ‘respect’ for the law. 
Stryker’s notion of a salience hierarchy of identities (2001) would 
suggest that lay judges’ perception of their role will depend on the inten-
sity of their judicial engagement. Where an identity occupies a significant 
part in an individual’s hierarchy of identities, it is more likely to be pre-
sented in interactions with others. Only conseillers acting as labour court 
presidents and vice-presidents in France are likely to be sufficiently en-
gaged in judicial activity for this to be a salient identity; sitting opportuni-
ties were too infrequent in Great Britain and Germany. In France too, 
some interviewees spoke of the external validation of being a lay judge 
(‘opening doors’, according to F EE 17), implying that this identity was 
presented in other settings. 
 
 
14.4 Lay judges: active or passive? 
 
Much of the literature on the role of lay judges in labour courts has con-
cluded that lay judges are generally passive during hearings. Our find-
ings suggest, firstly, that this perspective on the hearing needs to be 
qualified. And secondly, we argue that lay judges play an active part in 
deliberations, and on occasions their interventions can change the out-
come of a case. 
Lay judge activity in these two aspects of judicial proceedings varies 
profoundly by country. Notably, lay judges in France exercise a role for 
which there is no direct comparison in the other two countries: they 
manage the court, hear cases, determine and write the judgments. 
In terms of the lay role in hearings in Great Britain and Germany, our 
findings suggest that lay judges play a useful, at time vital, complemen-
tary role to the professional judge in Britain, arguably somewhat less so 
in Germany. This is due to certain, largely contingent, aspects of the 
management of hearings in British labour courts that require lay mem-
bers to take written notes of the proceedings. This creates some scope 
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for an active relationship between the professional and lay judges, some 
elements of which take place away from the public gaze. 
Lay judges play a significant part in deliberations in Great Britain and 
Germany, much of which is not evident to an external observer. These 
are constrained by the various pressures towards unanimity and, in Brit-
ain in particular, how precedent, the requirements of which are typically 
conveyed by the professional judge, governs the latitude for judicial rea-
soning. Both lay and professional judges in Britain reported on how the 
requirement to comply with these constraints occasionally led to a ten-
sion between the dictates of the law and a subjective sense of fairness. 
 
 
14.5 Knowledge and skills 
 
Our interview findings from lay and professional judges indicate that lay 
judges offer the court distinctive skills and knowledge. Some of this 
knowledge is explicit and often specific (how shift or pay systems oper-
ate, for example). Such knowledge could, on occasions, help ‘unlock’ a 
case.  
Lay skills and knowledge are often tacit, however, and acquired expe-
rientially through long exposure workplace events. They were often re-
ferred to as ‘common sense’, especially in Germany, as the capacity to 
assess evidence in the light of workplace norms (such indicating when 
an employee’s behaviour might warrant summary dismissal). Such 
knowledge or competence is in principle unavailable to, and was valued 
by, professional judge interviewees. This capacity would appear to fit 
closely with the concept of ‘practical intelligence’ suggested by Stern-
berg et al. (2000). 
Crucially for the role of lay judges in labour court proceedings, by its 
nature tacit knowledge is a form of understanding that needs to be elicit-
ed in the discursive process of deliberations, rather than evidence pro-
vided by an expert witness. 
One example of such a skill developed tacitly at the workplace might 
be termed ‘perspective switching’, in which a lay judge listens to both 
sides and is aware of their own partiality but can also see events from 
the standpoint of the ‘other side’ to their own panel. Some employer lay 
judges also expressly valued the different perspective that employee lay 
judges bring. These findings suggest that lay judges can inject multiple 
perspectives into deliberations that some research indicates will improve 
decision-making (see, for example, Nemeth, 1995). In addition, lay judg-
es needed observational and questioning skills in hearings. These were 
often developed through workplace and professional activity, and honed 
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through training, in particular in France and Great Britain. This would 
appear to fit with the notion of ‘rotation’ (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995), in 
which operating in overlapping contexts offers opportunities to transfer 
knowledge between them. 
Many lay judges had a high level of practical familiarity with the law, 
based on workplace representative activity or working as an HR manag-
er; several were legally qualified. The possession of legal knowledge 
plays a different role in France compared with Great Britain and Germa-
ny. While most British and German lay judges accepted a division of la-
bour with the professional judge, in which the latter applied the law, in 
France, lay judges apply the law without professional judges. Learning to 
act as a lay judge in France is therefore associated with passing through 
key stages of applying the law in court, the most significant of which is 
the first time a judgment is drafted. 
As well as bringing knowledge to the court, lay judges also reported 
that they could enhance their representational and personal-professional 
skills as a result of activity in the court. In this respect, lay participation 
might serve an ‘education function’ (Machura, 2016). For employee lay 
judges, this took the form of transferring knowledge acquired in court to 
the workplace (or trade union) and led to enhanced authority and confi-
dence vis-à-vis management. In France, this educative role was extend-
ed to include the parties. Conseillers attempted to explain the procedure 
and make judgments as understandable and non-technical as they 
could, while complying with the law. 
The extent to which lay judges can fulfil this expectation will depend 
on two factors: the institutional link between lay judges and workplace or 
nominating organisation; and the ‘density’ of lay judge presence in the 
workforce, as a ratio of lay judges to the working population.  
Our findings suggest that the ‘educative’ role is most likely to be ful-
filled in France, where the institutional link to trade unions (and to a 
lesser extent employer organisations) appears the strongest of the three 
countries. There is also a close link between the practice of workplace 
representation in Germany and activity as a lay judge: most employee 
lay judge interviewees had a background as a workplace representative. 
There is also scope for an educative function in Great Britain, where 
several employee lay judges were active as employee/trade union rep-
resentatives. This has become increasingly attenuated, however, as or-
ganisational nominees retire and the motivation to become a lay judge 
becomes more individual. At the same time, some employer lay judges 
reported a direct benefit to their professional lives from being a lay 
judge. 
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The ratio of lay judges to the working population is much higher in 
Germany and France, with 1 employee lay judge per 3,000 workers in 
each case. In Great Britain, the ratio is 1 per 52,000.  
 
 
14.6 Gender 
 
There is some evidence from interviews that gender played a role in mo-
tivation and in nomination in Great Britain. Female interviewees in Britain 
reported that workplace problems they had personally experienced con-
tributed to their motivation to become a lay judge. Some also reported 
that they had felt blocked from being nominated by their organisations 
(before 1999) and that self-nomination had enabled them to apply direct. 
On the other hand, both employer and employee lay judges said that or-
ganisations to which belonged had provided routes to becoming a lay 
judge. 
In Germany, men and women appeared to have different ideas about 
the nature of their contribution. Whereas men tended to emphasise the 
specialist knowledge they could bring to bear in deliberations, women 
highlighted a ‘social perspective’. 
In Great Britain, female lay judges welcomed the fact that there were 
more female professional judges and one said she found them to be 
‘more inclusive’. 
 
14.7 Relationships and the role of 
professional judges 
 
Previous research into mixed tribunals has focused on the interactions 
between professional and lay judges. In general, and drawing on status 
theories and complementary notions of ‘informational advantage’, this 
research has found that professional judges exercise domination and 
control (see Kutnjak Ivković, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2007; Dickens, 1985; 
and Blankenburg and Schönholz, 1979). 
Our findings offer a more nuanced, if not diametrically opposed, per-
spective on this.  
Hearings and deliberations differ as between the three countries in 
terms of status issues: status characteristics theory requires that exter-
nal sources of (perceived) status are imported into mixed tribunals and 
shape discourse within them. Status considerations exist in parallel to 
and on occasions interact with substantive procedural power.  
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Firstly, although the hearing was steered and controlled by the pro-
fessional judge in Germany and Great Britain, the situation was different 
in deliberations, where professional judges were seen generally as 
providing direction and structure but not dominating. In France, where 
the professional judges were only brought in if the lay judges failed to 
agree, they tended to be dominant.  
Secondly, in Germany and Great Britain professional judges had an 
informational advantage on matters of law and procedure. This was less 
marked in France, where professional judges do not study employment 
law and sit only occasionally in the labour court. On the issue of the case 
being heard, professional judges had a considerable advantage in Ger-
many as they conducted conciliation and exercised a monopoly over 
case papers. French professional judges also had some informational 
advantage, not so much through access to case papers but in not nec-
essarily disclosing their questioning strategy. In Great Britain, profes-
sional judges had only a limited informational advantage in terms of the 
particular case, possibly fostering a more collegial approach in the hear-
ing, reinforced by the practice of lay judges and professional judges 
reading evidence together. 
For Bourdieu (1987), the juridical field was characterised by a stark 
division between lay people and legal professionals on occasions lead-
ing to ‘the disqualification of the non-specialists’ sense of fairness’ (ibid. 
828). This tension was evident in many of the reported experiences of 
lay judges and of professionals. Nevertheless, our findings also suggest 
that this division is not as impermeable as Bourdieu implies. Firstly, 
some professional judges in Great Britain and Germany welcomed the 
scope to make law jointly, as the injection of workplace experience ena-
bled them to arrive at judgments in which the exigencies of the law could 
be made as consistent as possible with ‘common sense’ fairness. Inter-
ventions by lay judges could change the direction of a case. Secondly, 
some professional judges in Germany and Great Britain indicated that 
they welcomed the presence of lay judges as decision-makers as this 
gave them greater confidence in the judgment. And thirdly, in particular 
in Great Britain, lay judges had some latent power as professional judg-
es relied them as observers and note-takers in the hearing. Combined 
with the lower informational advantage of the professional in specific 
cases in Great Britain and the joint reading of documents, this arguably 
promotes the collegiality reported by most British lay judges and many 
professional judges. 
The majority of British and German lay judges considered that their 
relationship with professional judges was one of equality and, for many, 
collegiality based on working together collectively.  
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14.8 Main contribution of lay participation 
 
This sub-section suggests three main conclusions about the main direct 
contribution of lay judges. 
 
Workplace knowledge and experience 
In all three countries, the contribution mentioned most often by lay and 
professional judge interviewees was the ability to bring ‘workplace expe-
rience’ to bear in deliberations. This had two dimensions: specific 
knowledge (‘knowing that’) and a general non-legal appreciation of 
workplace norms. ‘Knowing that’ was highlighted by male lay judge in-
terviewees in Germany, in contrast to some female lay judges, who high-
lighted a ‘social’ perspective. This possibly suggests a (gendered) per-
ception of a hierarchy of knowledge in which (some) male lay judges 
place a high ranking on ‘hard facts’, which complements a legal perspec-
tive: lay judges introducing a specialist opinion was one of the factors 
cited as likely to change the direction of a case. Professional judges in 
Germany also highlighted the value of specialist knowledge. In contrast, 
a ‘social’ perspective would tend to run counter to legal reasoning. This 
was not inevitably the case: one German professional judge noted that if 
the ‘legal’ solution clashed with what was deemed fair, this would merit a 
second look. 
Possibly located between these two forms of workplace experience is 
deep knowledge of workplace industrial relations built up over many 
years by employee and managerial practitioners. This ability to ‘read’ 
events represents a form of tacit knowledge obtained through observa-
tion and action (such as negotiating or representing employees). This 
capacity was identified as a key contribution by lay judge interviewees in 
all three countries and confirmed by professional judges.  
In Germany and Great Britain, the usefulness of having a mixed panel 
of employee and employers was also highlighted. And in Germany, a 
mixed panel of experienced practitioners was directly referred to as ena-
bling the lay judges to assist the professional judge in exploring the 
scope for a settlement once a full hearing was under way. And in Great 
Britain and Germany, professional and lay judges highlighted the ad-
vantages of the multiple perspectives offered by mixed panels. 
The contribution of lay judges’ workplace knowledge is arguably more 
important in Germany and France than Great Britain. This is because 
professional judges in Germany are career judges who embark on this 
track as soon as they qualify. In Great Britain, in contrast, professional 
judges must first have had a minimum of five years’ experience as law-
yers (working as solicitors or barristers, in civil society organisations or in 
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academia). As a result, many know, albeit indirectly through their clients, 
about a wide range of workplaces and are not as reliant as professional 
judges in Germany and France on lay judges’ workplace experience. 
Furthermore, the role of workplace experience has been diminished in 
Great Britain as lay judges no longer sit on discrete unfair dismissal cas-
es, for which an understanding of workplace norms is significant as the 
key factor is often whether an employer acted reasonably. 
 
Life experience 
In Great Britain, direct life experience of discrimination - on grounds of 
gender, race or disability - was also cited by some interviewees as a fur-
ther source of knowledge and insight and a particular contribution that 
they could offer to judicial proceedings. Again, this form of knowledge 
has both explicit and tacit aspects, with the latter only available to those 
sharing a characteristic with a party to litigation. This has particular rele-
vance in Great Britain as lay judges now sit predominantly on cases in-
volving discrimination, in contrast to France, where most discrimination 
cases are resolved by mediation through the Défenseur des Droits. 
Broader life experience was also noted as a key contribution in Ger-
many, distilled into the notion of ‘common sense’ that could correct a 
narrow legalistic form of reasoning. 
 
Procedural fairness 
Procedural fairness was highlighted in Germany by lay and professional 
judges, both as contributing to a fair process in the court but also meet-
ing a general aspiration to ensure that justice was done. For some Ger-
man and French lay judges, there is a desire to support the principle of 
lay participation within the system of labour jurisdiction. 
In France, the social proximity of conseillers, employer and employee, 
and parties generated a substantive approach to procedural fairness in 
that there was a perceived obligation to explain the law to litigants 
through a non-technical approach to proceedings and drafting of the 
judgment. 
Procedural fairness also leads on to the issue of legitimacy. 
 
 
14.9 Legitimacy 
 
A legitimate power is one that individuals regard as rightfully exercising 
authority (Beetham, 2013). For labour courts, legitimacy would imply that 
such institutions exercise rightful authority in the eyes of the parties, in-
dustrial relations actors, and the wider society. It is also relevant, but not 
decisive, whether actors within a specific sub-system, such as labour 
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courts, also consider their actions to be legitimate. Participants, such as 
lay judges, are not solely ‘insiders’, but also, by definition, span the 
boundary between the judicial and non-judicial worlds. 
Three concepts that might be useful in exploring the legitimacy of the 
role of lay judges: performance legitimacy, regime legitimacy, and polity 
legitimacy. (This has been explored by two of the present authors else-
where: see Burgess, Corby and Latreille, 2014).  ‘Performance legitima-
cy’ relates to the capacity of an institution to deliver the goals it is en-
trusted with; ‘regime legitimacy’ refers to its accountability; in the judicial 
context, ‘polity legitimacy’ refers to the extent to which labour courts 
echo wider national social and constitutional arrangements. Regime le-
gitimacy and polity legitimacy, which concern the normative validity of an 
authority, are aspects where the views of those subject to that authority 
and wider society are the most relevant, but about which the views of the 
actors are also significant. Our interviewees expressed a range of views 
about the regime and polity legitimacy of their systems. 
In Great Britain, interviewees felt that there had been two main 
changes in the ‘labour court regime’ in recent years. 1) judicialisation 
(formalisation, legal representation); and more recently 2) the effective 
removal of lay judges from dismissal cases. The latter was a source of 
almost universal criticism as noted above. Nevertheless, on balance in-
terviewees continued to believe strongly in the need for a distinctive la-
bour jurisdiction and offered suggestions for improvement (see Chapter 
13). 
In Germany, some professional judges interviewed noted that the 
presence of lay judges was significant for the legitimacy of the court and 
raised the acceptance of the process and judgments.   
‘Performance legitimacy’ links the validity of an authority with whether 
this authority can offer procedural justice based on its effectiveness in 
producing decisions that are accepted as fair because decisions are 
produced through a system seen to be competent. Indicators of this 
might be the extent to which court decisions are rejected by the parties 
by being appealed. This is not explored here, but was considered in 
Corby and Burgess (2014), which concluded that it was virtually impos-
sible to make meaningful cross-national comparisons of appeal rates. 
Our findings suggest that the active involvement of lay judges in deliber-
ations in Britain and Germany, as validated by the assessment of pro-
fessional judges, contributes to the performance legitimacy of labour 
courts in these two countries. ‘The contribution is substantial, as well as 
procedural’ (GB PJ 5).   
In France, the effective performance of lay judges in terms of resolv-
ing a case at the first merits hearing was noted by interviewees. Con-
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seillers generally tried to avoid a case going to the professional judge 
and not achieving unanimity was seen as a mark of failure. Resort to a 
tie-break occurred in around one-fifth of cases, which might be viewed 
as an effective performance given the composition of the court. 
  
 
14.10 Further research 
 
This study highlights a number of areas that might be explored through 
further research. 
Given the high profile of training in developing judicial skills, as well 
as in induction and socialisation, that emerged in this study, it might be 
fruitful to compare training curricula and delivery arrangements for lay 
judges on a cross-national basis. This could also throw light on differing 
conceptions of lay judgecraft in the three countries. Further qualitative 
research might also be relevant in tracing specific forms of knowledge 
transfer and the ‘educative effect’ in greater detail. 
Lay participation in other bodies fulfilling similar functions could also 
be compared cross-nationally: examples might include social security 
tribunals in Germany and Great Britain.  
Finally, the qualitative research and the conclusions drawn from it 
suggest hypotheses that might be tested through quantitative study on 
issues such as lay skills and knowledge, the lay contribution in judicial 
decision-making, mutual perceptions of the judicial actors, and relation-
ships in mixed tribunals.  
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Appendix: Methodology 
 
Research strategy and design 
The project’s research strategy and methods focused on the perceptions 
and reported experiences of employee lay judges and other judicial ac-
tors (employer lay judges and professional judges) in labour courts in 
France, Germany and Great Britain. These countries were chosen be-
cause lay judges act as decision makers in adjudicating individual em-
ployment rights disputes. Moreover, first-instance lay judges, whether 
appointed or elected, are not required to be certified legal experts.  
The chosen method to collect data was qualitative research using 
semi-structured interview guides. This was complemented by desk re-
search and expert interviews. Some members of the research team ob-
served labour court proceedings, employing non-participant observation. 
 
Sampling 
Within each country, samples were determined by methods that differed, 
depending on national institutional arrangements and the requirements 
of the judicial authorities. A standard information sheet was prepared 
and potential interviewees had access to a three-language project web-
site (https://www.gre.ac.uk/business/research/centres/weru/research-
projects/the-roles,-resources-and-competencies-of-worker-lay-judges-a-
cross-national-study).  
Reflecting the focus on employee lay judges, the aim in each country 
was to conduct 40 interviews with employees, 12 with employers and 12 
with professional judges, divided in pre-stated proportions between the 
agreed locations. On some occasions, more than the precise number of 
interviews was undertaken locally if potential interview subjects were 
immediately on hand.  
Sampling was guided by convenience in terms of interview locations 
and through self-selection by participating individuals. The researchers 
generally applied quota sampling: once the agreed number of interview-
ees in each category had been met, no further interviewees were cho-
sen from this category at a location. There was no deliberate attempt to 
obtain a stratified sample.  
The choice of locations for the interviews was influenced by the de-
sire for a regional spread in each country (including the three constituent 
countries of Great Britain). Interviews were held as follows: 
 In Great Britain, in Central London, Birmingham, Manchester, Glas-
gow, and Cardiff. 
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 In France, in Nantes, Strasbourg, Bobigny, Versailles, and Boulogne-
Billancourt.  
 In Germany, in Halle, Berlin, Dortmund and Mannheim.  
 
Interviewees gave consent to being interviewed and recorded. They 
were informed of the context of the study (including the funding body) 
and the use that would be made of their data. Interview data were anon-
ymised. Transcripts are securely held both physically and electronically. 
Interview guides were drafted first in English and then translated and lo-
calised. Information on personal characteristics, length of time as a 
worker lay judge, trade union affiliation, other trade union or civil society 
roles, educational attainment etc. was collected at the interview 
 
Achieved sample and interviewee characteristics 
In Germany, 53 interviews were conducted with lay judges (41 employ-
ee/12 employer) and 13 with professional judges at first instance labour 
courts. Key characteristics of the German sample were: 
 Gender. Of the lay judges, 55 per cent were male and 45 per cent 
female. Of the professional judges, 57 per cent were male and 43 per 
cent female. 
 Age. 11 per cent of the lay judges were under 45, 77 per cent be-
tween 45 and 64, and 9 per cent over 65. Three of the lay judges (6 
per cent) were retired. 
 Union membership. Of the 41 employee lay judges, 38 (93 per cent) 
were currently members of a trade union and 31 (76 per cent) were or 
had been elected workplace employee representatives. 
 Sector. Of the lay judges, 26 per cent worked in the public sector 
(compared with 7 per cent of the overall workforce in Germany). 
 Eleven of the lay judges served as lay members in other courts, for 
the most social courts. 
 Five lay judges had a formal legal qualification. 
  
In Great Britain, 54 interviews were conducted with lay judges (41 em-
ployee/13 employer) and 12 with professional judges. Key characteris-
tics of the British sample were: 
 Gender. Of the lay judges, 28 were female (52 per cent) and 26 male 
(48 per cent). Of the professional judges, 6 were male and 6 female. 
 Age and length of office. Of the lay judges, no interviewees were un-
der 45, 31 (57 per cent) were aged 45-64, and 23 (43 per cent) were 
over 65. 41 (76 per cent) had been a lay judge for 11 years or more.  
 Union membership. Of the 41 employee lay judges, 27 (66 per cent) 
were currently a member of a trade union. Two employer lay judges 
(in higher education) were trade union members. 
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 Sector and status. Of the lay judges, 23 (43 per cent) were retired 
and 18 were self-employed or business owners (33 per cent), includ-
ing 10 of the 41 employee judges. Of the employee lay judges, 11 
were employees (27 per cent), 25 (61 per cent) were working or had 
worked in the public sector, 2 in manufacturing, 4 in private services, 
and 10 for a trade union. Of the employers, 6 worked or had worked 
in private services, 5 in industry, and 2 in higher education. 
 Education. 35 British employee lay judges (85 per cent) had received 
tertiary education and 11 of the 12 employer judges (92 per cent). 
Five employee lay judges in our sample of 41 had a formal legal qual-
ification. All the British employer lay judges interviewed and three of 
the British employee lay judges interviewed had an HRM qualification 
which often includes an employment law dimension.  
  
In France, 40 interviews were conducted with lay judges. This was less 
than aimed for, and was due to problems of access at one labour court. 
Of the 40, 30 were employee lay judges and 10 were employer lay judg-
es. Five professional judges were interviewed. Key characteristics were: 
 Gender. 11 employee lay judges were female (36 per cent) and 19 
male (64 per cent). All professional judges were female. 
 Union membership. All the employee lay judges were trade union 
members, spread across the main confederations. For the employers, 
interviewees were from MEDEF, CGPME and ESS. 
 Length of office: it was difficult to interview new lay judges as the 
most recent round of elections and appointments was held in 2008. 
 
Reliability and validity 
In qualitative research, reliability is grounded in procedures to ensure 
that results obtained should not vary depending on the interviewer. Reli-
ability was assessed by means of the pilots. The coding system also 
provided a basis for reliability by offering a common approach to analys-
ing transcripts. Inter-coder reliability was checked by exchanging and 
cross-checking coded transcripts.  
‘Validity’ in qualitative research refers to whether the research instru-
ments used accurately capture the construct to be ascertained. Lewis 
and Ritchie (2003: 274) propose the following checklist for assessing 
approaches to validity. This is set out below, with a note of the approach 
used in the present study.  
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Checklist for validity 
 
 Explanation Approach in current study 
Capture of the 
phenomena 
Was the environment and the 
quality of questioning sufficiently 
effective for participants to fully 
express/explore their views? 
Interview surroundings (court 
or home/work) were deemed 
conducive to obtaining data. 
Interview guides included 
specific and open questions. 
Identification 
or labelling 
Have the phenomena been 
identified, categorised and 
'named' in ways that reflect the 
meanings assigned by study 
participants 
Interview guides designed to 
capture interviewees’ experi-
ences and allow their words 
to constitute evidence, includ-
ing through coding. 
Interpretation Is there sufficient evidence 
for the explanatory accounts of-
fered? 
See analysis below. 
Display Have findings been portrayed in 
a way that remains 'true' to the 
data and allows others to see 
the analytic constructions made? 
See analysis below. 
 
Source: Ritchie and Lewis (2003: 274) 
 
Analysis of findings 
Analysis of primary data was based on the approach of qualitative con-
tent analysis. This took place in three stages: 
 Initial identification of themes following data collection and coding.  
 Refinement of themes and interpretations following first stage of pri-
mary analysis. 
 Additional exploration of primary data by reading entire transcripts. 
 
Transcripts were coded using MaxQDA based on a common set of 
codes. Local research teams had scope to add codes or use in vivo cod-
ing. Where appropriate, data was quantized to emphasise the frequency 
of particular responses and highlight differences between the country 
data sets, using such terms as ‘many’, ‘most’ and ‘few’. The term ‘quan-
tize’, to mean using coded qualitative data to obtain quantitative evi-
dence, originates with Tashakori and Teddlie (1998), cited in Driscoll 
(2007). Such terms have a common-sense value in indicating the main 
features of the sample, without any claim to generalisability.  
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This research project analysed and compared the roles, resources and competen-
cies of lay judges in Germany, France and Great Britain, where lay judges take up 
their role through nationally distinctive routes: nomination essentially by the social 
partners in Germany, self-nomination in Great Britain and election in France. The 
primary research consisted of qualitative data collected through interviews, set 
against contextual information on national institutional arrangements, industrial rela-
tions, and court procedures. 
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